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I. INTRODUCTION
Rule 806 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which governs impeachment of
a hearsay declarant, is a powerful weapon in both civil and criminal litigation. 1
For the most part, however, it has been overlooked by lawyers and by
commentators. 2 Rule 806 deserves considerably more careful consideration
than it has received, because the rule as written creates the potential for great
prejudice and because it contains ambiguities that are causing confusion among
and within the circuit courts of appeals.
Rule 806 performs an apparently simple function: it permits a nontestifying
declarant whose out-of-court statement is introduced into evidence-either
because it is admissible hearsay or because it is defined as nonhearsay in Rule
801(d)(2)(C), (D), or (E)-to be impeached as if the declarant actually had
testified as a witness. 3
* Assistant Professor of Law, Capital University Law and Graduate Center; B.A.,
University of the Pacific, 1983; J.D., Boalt Hall School of Law, 1986; B.C.L., Oxford
University, 1988. I wish to thank Professors Eleanor Swift, Barbara Rook Snyder, Harry
Litman, Max Kravitz, Daniel Kobil, Steven Kautz, Ronald Friedman, and William Bluth
for their valuable suggestions. I also would like to express my thanks to Alesia Holliday for
her assistance with the research of this Article.
I Rule 806 was adopted in 1975 within the original body of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. Although it was amended in 1987 to make its language gender-neutral, no
substantive change has ever been made to the rule.
2 See ABA LITIGATION SEcrIoN, EMERGING PROBLEMS UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES Op
EVIDENCE 532 (2d ed. 1991) ("There is little doubt that Rule 806 is underutilized."). The
rule also has received little discussion to date in the literature. See Anthony M. Brannon,
Successfid Sh dowboxing: 77e Art of Impeaching Hearsay Declarants, 13 CAMPBELL L.
REV. 157, 158 (1991); Kimberly B. Glass, Comment, Impeachment of Nontestiffing
Hearsay Declarants: A Neglected Weapon of Trial Practice, 43 ALA. L. REV. 445, 445, 460
(1992); cf Maureen A. Gorman & James Smith, Evidence: The 1984-85 Term-A Selective
Review of Seventh Crcuit Decisions Applying the Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 CHi.-Kmrr
L. Ray. 527, 546 (1986).
3 FED. R. EVID. 806. Rule 806 provides in full:
When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in Rule 801(d)(2), (C), (D), or
(E), has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be attacked, and
if attacked may be supported, by any evidence which would be admissible for those
purposes if declarant had testified as a witness. Evidence of a statement or conduct by
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The rule rests on a straightforward premise. When an out-of-court
statement is admitted for its truth, the trier of fact must evaluate the importance
and trustworthiness of the statement, just as if the statement had been made
from the witness stand. In performing that evaluation, the credibility of the
person who made the statement is often a central concern for the fact-finder.
When an out-of-court statement is admitted for its truth, therefore, the
declarant's credibility is in issue, in the same manner as it would be if the
declarant were a testifying witness. In drafting Rule 806, the Advisory
Committee recognized this point, stating: "The declarant of a hearsay statement
which is admitted in evidence is in effect a witness. His credibility should in
fairness be subject to impeachment and support as though he had in fact
testified." 4
Rule 806 thus seeks to allow litigants to treat declarants, for impeachment
purposes, as if they were testifying witnesses. Accordingly, the rule is designed
to permit a party to impeach a declarant using any method of impeachment that
is permissible against a live witness.5 In addition, however, the rule also
operates as a restriction, by limiting impeachment to those situations when it is
independently authorized under some other rule of evidence. 6
the declarant at any time, inconsistent with the declarant's hearsay statement, is not
subject to any requirement that the declarant may have been afforded an opportunity to
deny or explain. If the party against whom a hearsay statement has been admitted calls
the declarant as a witness, the party is entitled to examine the declarant on the statement
as if under cross-examination.
Id. Rule 801 defines a declarant as "a person who makes a statement" and defines hearsay
as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." FED. R. EVID. 801 (b), (c).
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) defines statements that qualify as party admissions;
those definitions are set out infra at note 126.
4 FED. R. EvID. 806 advisory committee's note; see also United States v. Moody, 903
F.2d 321, 328-29 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Finley, 934 F.2d 837, 839 (7th Cir.
1991); United States v. Graham, 858 F.2d 986, 990 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1020 (1989).
5 United States v. Scott, No. 93-7552, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 5598, at *21 (5th Cir.
Mar. 21, 1995) ("[A]ny evidence that would have been admissible to impeach [the
declarant] had he testified was admissible to impeach [the declarant] even though he did not
testify."); see also MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EvIDENcE § 806.1, at
1005-06 (3d ed. 1991); 4 DAVID W. LOUiSELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 501, at 1240 (1980).
6 See Finley, 934 F.2d at 839 (stating that Rule 806 "does not allow the use of
evidence made inadmissible by some other rule. Rule 806 extends the privilege of
impeaching the declarant of a hearsay statement but does not obliterate the rules of evidence
that govern how impeachment is to proceed."). More generally, as the Fifth Circuit has
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Since Rule 806 merely permits a declarant to be impeached as if he were a
testifying witness, it is a "piggyback" rule that operates only in conjunction
with the other impeachment rules. This aspect of the rule, however, greatly
complicates the achievement of the rule's apparently simple rationale.
When the other impeachment rules-which govern, for instance,
impeachment with prior convictions, past bad acts, and prior inconsistent
statements7-were formulated, they were designed to operate with respect to
witnesses who testified in court. This expectation that the impeachment rules
would be used against testifying witnesses significantly influenced the policy
considerations and balancing of interests that shaped those rules. Thus, for
instance, when Congress debated and eventually enacted Rule 609, which
governs impeachment with prior convictions, Congress assumed that the rule
would only permit impeachment of testifying witnesses, and the careful
compromise embodied in Rule 609 is premised on that assumption. 8
Rule 806, by contrast, is premised squarely on the opposite assumption: it
assumes that the declarant will not be a testifying witness. When the other
impeachment rules are used in conjunction with Rule 806, therefore, they are
being used in a context very different from that envisioned when they were
drafted. As a result, the balance of competing considerations that underlies the
other impeachment rules is disrupted, leaving open the possibility of great and
unintended mischief.
As written, Rule 806 does little to guard against this possibility. With one
exception,9 the rule does not specifically address how it is to be used in
explained: "The scope of impeachment parallels that available if the declarant had testified
in court, since rule 806 treats the physical location of the testifying declarant, for
impeachment purposes, as legally insignificant." Moody, 903 F.2d at 329.
7 FED. R. EVID. 609 (prior convictions), 608(b) (past bad acts), 613 (prior inconsistent
statements).
8 See, e.g., 120 CoNG. REc. 2376 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Hogan); id. at 2377
(remarks of Rep. Dennis); see also infra note 17 and accompanying text.
9 Rule 806 does contain a provision designed to facilitate its combination with Rule
613, which governs impeachment with inconsistent statements. Rule 613 generally provides
that extrinsic evidence of inconsistent statements may be admitted only if "the witness is
afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an
opportunity to interrogate the witness thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require."
FED. R. EviD. 613(b).
Recognizing the difficulty, and sometimes the impossibility, of complying with Rule
613's requirements with respect to a declarant who may not be present at trial, Rule 806
specifically directs that "[elvidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant at any time,
inconsistent with the declarant's hearsay statement, is not subject to any requirement that the
declarant may have been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain." FED. R. EvID. 806;
see also id. advisory committee's note.
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conjunction with the various restrictions and rationales of the other
impeachment rules. Rather, Rule 806 offers only the general principle that a
declarant's credibility may be impeached with evidence that would be
admissible if the declarant had testified as a witness. As a consequence, Rule
806 fails to deal effectively with some of the difficult problems associated with
permitting impeachment of a nontestifying declarant. Indeed, in some
circumstances, the rule leads to startlingly prejudicial results.
This Article explores in depth the tensions and unintended defects in Rule
806. In doing so, the Article focuses on three areas in which the combination
of Rule 806 with other evidentiary rules raises important and difficult
questions.
First, the Article discusses the relationship between Rule 806 and Rule
609, looking particularly at the disturbing but very real possibility that the
combination of the two rules will permit a prosecutor (or a codefendant) to
impeach a criminal defendant with his prior convictions, even though he neither
testified nor did anything to place his credibility in issue. Second, the Article
considers the intersection between Rule 806 and Rule 608(b), focusing on
whether it is sensible to enforce Rule 608(b)'s ban on extrinsic evidence when
that rule is applied through Rule 806. Third, the Article analyzes the proper
extent of Rule 806's application to declarants of statements admitted as party
admissions under Rule 801(d)(2) and, in particular, to declarants of individual
and adoptive admissions. The Article concludes that there are serious
deficiencies in Rule 806 as currently written and applied and offers a proposed
revision of Rule 806 that will better enable the rule to serve both its own
purposes and those of the impeachment rules with which it is jointly applied.' 0
II. USE OF RULE 609 THROUGH RULE 806
Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides one of the most potent,
and potentially prejudicial, methods of impeachment. Under Rule 609, counsel
may impeach the credibility of a witness with the witness's prior convictions,
subject to specified requirements and limitations.'1 In a criminal case, when the
10 The Judicial Conference of the United States' Advisory Committee on the Federal
Rules of Evidence is currently studying the Federal Rules of Evidence with the aim of
proposing amendments to update and improve them. The Advisory Committee is chaired by
Judge Ralph K. Winter, Jr., with Professor Margaret A. Berger serving as the Committee's
Reporter. See Ernest E. Svenson, Judicial Conference to Review Rules of Evidence, 18
LrrGATIoN NEWS No. 6, Aug. 1993, at 2.
11 FED. R. EvID. 609. Rule 609(a), which sets forth the "[gieneral rule" on
impeachment with prior convictions, provides:
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defendant is impeached with his prior convictions, it is widely recognized that
the defendant faces a unique, and often devastating, form of prejudice. This
prejudice arises from the significant risk that the jury will not use the evidence
of convictions solely to evaluate the defendant's credibility, but also will use it
as evidence of guilt or moral desert. 12 Because of this risk, Rule 609 was
carefully crafted to achieve what its framers believed to be an acceptable
balance between accommodating the prosecution's need for probative
impeaching evidence and the defendant's right to be protected against undue
prejudice.
That balance, which was achieved only after months of congressional
debate and painstaking revision, 13 is embodied in Rule 609, which permits a
criminal defendant to be impeached, without restriction, with prior convictions
for offenses involving dishonesty or false statement. 14 With respect to other
convictions, however, Rule 609 permits a criminal defendant to be impeached
only if the crime was a felony and the prosecution demonstrates that the prior
conviction's probative value on the issue of credibility outweighs the risk of
prejudice to the defendant. 15 As such, Rule 609 represents a "'deliberate, yet
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, (1) evidence that a witness
other than an accused has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule
403, if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under
the law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has been
convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative
value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and (2)
evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it involved
dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
Id.
12 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee's note to Amended Rule 609(a)
(amended 1990); 3 JAcK B. WEINsTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
609[021, at 609-31 (Aug. 1991); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Prior Crime Impeachment of
Criminal Defendants: A Constitutional Analysis of Rde 609, 82 W. VA. L. Rnv. 391, 392
(1980).
13 See United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 360-61 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (describing the
"labyrinthine history of Rule 609"); see also Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490
U.S. 504, 511-24 (1989) (same); United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1059-62
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (same); 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 12, 609[011-[03], at 609-1
to -41 (same).
14 FED. R. EViD. 609(a)(2).
15 FED. R. EviD. 609(a)(1). More precisely, Rule 609(a)(1) requires that "the crime
was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which
the witness was convicted. . . ." This definition is generally co-extensive with the definition
of a felony.
1995]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
uneasy compromise between opposing positions in a sharply-divided
Congress.'"16
In reaching this compromise, it is clear that advocates on both sides of the
congressional debate assumed that Rule 609 would permit impeachment of the
criminal defendant only if he actually chose to testify in his own defense. 17
This assumption played a critical role in the drafting of Rule 609, because
Congress reached its careful compromise against the backdrop of its
understanding that, if the criminal defendant feared that introduction of his
prior convictions would unduly prejudice his case, he could protect himself by
declining to testify.
When Rule 609 is employed in conjunction with Rule 806, however, it
becomes possible to impeach even a nontestifying criminal defendant with his
prior convictions. And this is true, regardless of whether the defendant has
done anything to put his credibility in issue, as long as the defendant's out-of-
court statement has been admitted for its truth.' 8 This use of Rule 806
16 Green, 490 U.S. at 523 n.28 (quoting Teree E. Foster, Rule 609(a) in the Ovil
Context: A Recommendation for Reform, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 8 (1988)); see also Smith,
551 F.2d at 360-61 ("Rule 609 was one of the most hotly contested provisions in the
Federal Rules of Evidence. The current language of the rule is unquestionably the product
of careful deliberation and compromise."); Lipscomb, 702 F.2d at 1063 ("the final version
of Rule 609(a)(1) must be understood as a compromise between the House preference for
excluding all prior convictions unless the crime involved 'dishonesty or false statement' and
the Senate preference for admitting all prior felony convictions"); 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER,
supra note 12, at 609-8,-25.
17 For instance, Representative Hogan, a principal proponent of broad rights to
impeach, argued: "The proponents of [allowing impeachment only with convictions of
crimes involving dishonesty or false statement] argue that allowing proof of prior
convictions unfairly prejudices the jury against the accused who takes the stand. First of all,
the fifth amendment gives him the right to refuse to take the stand at all and thereby prevent
all prior convictions from coming to the jury's attention." 120 CONG. REc. 2376 (1974)
(emphasis added); see also id. at 1414 (remarks of Rep. Hogan). Similarly, Representative
Dennis, a principal proponent of narrow rights to impeach, argued: "Now, it is a great
anomaly that we [permit unrestricted cross-examination with prior convictions], because
unless the man takes the witness stand, if he is a criminal defendant, it is absolutely
impossible, ordinarily, to put in any evidence concerning his previous convictions. . .. " Id.
at 2377 (emphasis added); see id. at 1419 (remarks of Rep. Dennis). Many other speakers
echoed this same point. See, e.g., id. at 2378 (remarks of Rep. Brasco); id. at 2381
(remarks of Rep. Lott); id. at 37,080 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy). This assumption that Rule
609 would permit impeachment only of a defendant who chose to testify is not surprising
because Rule 609, by itself, only operates against a testifying witness.
18 See United States v. Newman, 849 F.2d 156, 161-63 (5th Cir. 1988); United States
v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 64, 67-68 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Bovain, 708 F.2d 606,
613-14 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 898, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 997, and cert.
[Vol. 56:495
EVIDENCE RULE 806
completely undermines Congress's assumption that the criminal defendant
would be able to shield himself from introduction of his prior convictions by
choosing not to testify. In doing so, Rule 806 offers an unforeseen and
unsettling end run around the careful balance drawn in Rule 609. Moreover, by
permitting Rule 609 to be used in this manner, Rule 806 imposes substantial,
and in some circumstances unjustifiable, risks on the criminal defendant.
A. The Intersection Between Rules 609 and 806: Impeachment of a
Nontestifying Criminal Defendant
Rule 806 clearly contemplates that a party may use Rule 609 to impeach
the declarant of a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in Rule
801(d)(2)(C), (D), or (E), with his prior convictions. 19 All of the courts that
have examined the issue have so held.20 Because Rule 806 places no
restrictions on which declarants may be impeached, a criminal defendant whose
out-of-court statements have been admitted for their truth is subject to
impeachment under Rule 806.21 Thus, even a criminal defendant who chooses
not to testify may nevertheless be subject to impeachment with his prior
convictions if he becomes a declarant at his trial.
Most obviously, a criminal defendant can become a declarant if the
defendant introduces his own out-of-court statement for its truth.22 In this
situation, Rule 806 by its terms permits the credibility of the defendant-as
declarant-to be attacked with evidence of his prior convictions under Rule
609, even if the defendant does not take the witness stand.23
In addition, a criminal defendant can become a declarant if another party
introduces the defendant's out-of-court statement for its truth. In this situation,
denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983); United States v. Lawson, 608 F.2d 1129, 1129-30 (6th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1091 (1980).
19 See FED. R. EviD. 806 advisory committee's note (citing Rule 609 in explaining the
scope and rationale of Rule 806).
20 United States v. Moody, 903 F.2d 321, 328-29 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Hall, 854 F.2d 1036, 1042-43 (7th Cir. 1988); Newman, 849 F.2d at 161-63; Robinson,
783 F.2d at 67-68; United States v. Noble, 754 F.2d 1324, 1330-31 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 818 (1985); Bovain, 708 F.2d at 613-14; Lawson, 608 F.2d at 1130; see
also Rose Hall Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Overseas Banking Corp., 576 F. Supp. 107, 156-
57 (D. Del. 1983) (apparently assuming that Rule 609 would apply through Rule 806), aff'd
mem., 740 F.2d 958 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1159 (1985).
21 See Noble, 754 F.2d at 1330-31; Bovain, 708 F.2d at 613-14; Lawson, 608 F.2d at
1130.
22 FED. R. Evm. 801(c).
23 See Noble, 754 F.2d at 1330-3 1; Lawson, 608 F.2d at 1129-30.
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Rule 806 apparently permits the criminal defendant to be impeached with his
prior convictions, even though the defendant did nothing to place his credibility
in issue.24
The drafters of Rules 609 and 806 appear not to have contemplated that the
rules would combine to permit impeachment in these situations. Indeed, the
possibility that a criminal defendant who chose not to testify could be
impeached with his prior convictions is utterly at odds with the assumptions
that underlie Rule 609. The question, therefore, is whether application of Rule
609 through Rule 806 against the nontestifying criminal defendant is consistent
with the purposes of those rules and, in particular, with the delicate balance of
competing policies embodied in Rule 609.
B. The Propriety of Using Rule 609 Through Rule 806 Against a
Nontestifying Criminal Defendant
1. Use of Rule 609 Against a Criminal Defendant Who Offers His Own
Hearsay Statements in Order to Advance His Case
As noted above, the criminal defendant can become a declarant by offering
into evidence his own hearsay statements. The facts of United States v. Noble25
provide a good example of this situation.
Noble was charged with conspiracy to distribute and distribution of
counterfeit money. At trial, Noble did not testify. His lawyer, however,
introduced a taped conversation between Noble and a Secret Service agent,
who had been posing as an interested buyer. During that conversation, Noble
repeatedly denied any knowledge of the counterfeiting operations. After
introduction of the taped conversation, the prosecution impeached Noble with a
prior counterfeiting conviction. 26
Rule 806, by its terms, permits such impeachment in this situation. By
introducing his own exculpatory hearsay statements, Noble became a declarant.
As such, his credibility was subject to attack under Rule 806, and the
24 See Bovain, 708 F.2d at 613-14; Robinson, 783 F.2d at 67-68.
25 754 F.2d 1324.
26 Id. at 1330-31. Similarly, in Lawson, the defendant was charged with uttering and
possessing counterfeit money. Lawson, 608 F.2d at 1130. Although Lawson did not testify,
Lawson's counsel introduced a written statement in which Lawson denied all complicity in
the counterfeiting activities. In addition, in cross-examining a prosecution witness (a Secret
Service agent), Lawson's counsel brought out the fact that Lawson had consistently denied
any involvement in the scheme. The prosecution then impeached Lawson with two prior
felony convictions. Id. The courts did not identify in either Noble or Lawson the specific
hearsay exceptions that rendered the defendants' own hearsay statements admissible.
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prosecution was entitled to use any authorized method of impeachment,
including impeachment with prior convictions under Rule 609.27
Moreover, use of Rule 609 through Rule 806 against a nontestifying
defendant in these circumstances comports with the rationales of both rules.
Rule 806 is founded on the notion that the declarant of an out-of-court
statement which is admitted for its truth is in effect a witness, and thus in
fairness his credibility should be subject to impeachment to the same extent as
if he had in fact testified. When Noble introduced his own exculpatory out-of-
court statements he, in effect, became a witness for himself, even though he did
not actually take the witness stand. It is therefore entirely consistent with the
rationale of Rule 806 to allow the prosecutor to impeach Noble "as though he
had in fact testified." 28
Use of Rule 609 through Rule 806 in these circumstances also is consistent
with the purpose of Rule 609. A motivating force behind Rule 609's enactment
was the concern that, if the defendant were immune from impeachment with
prior convictions, the defendant would be able to "appear as a witness of
blameless life."29 In permitting the criminal defendant to be impeached with his
prior convictions, Congress expressed its judgment that the prosecution's need
to protect against such misrepresentation can justify the substantial risk of
prejudice to the accused. 30
Where, in an effort to advance his case, the defendant offers his own
hearsay statements, it seems well within the intended scope of Rule 609 to
allow the prosecutor to impeach the defendant's credibility. The facts of Noble
are instructive. There, the defendant offered his own exculpatory hearsay
statements, even though he did not formally testify. In doing so, Noble
affirmatively made his credibility an issue, because he was telling his story
27 FED. R. EVID. 806. In affirming Noble's conviction, the Seventh Circuit held that
Rule 806 applied. The court reasoned: "When Noble's counsel introduced the taped
conversation into evidence containing the defendant's exculpatory hearsay statements, the
defense counsel made the defendant's credibility an issue." Noble, 754 F.2d at 1331; see
also Lawson, 608 F.2d at 1130.28 FED. R. EvID. 806 advisory committee's note.
29 120 CONG. REC. 1414 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Hogan); 1 MCCORMICK ON
EViDENCE § 42, at 153 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter MCCORMICK]; 3
WEINsTEIN& BERGER, supra note 12, 609[021, at 609-41; Nichol, supra note 12, at 407-
09.
30 With respect to felonies not bearing directly on the defendant's veracity, the
compromise embodied in Rule 609 recognizes the need for a case-by-case determination of
whether the probative value of the impeaching evidence is sufficient to justify subjecting the
defendant to such prejudice. See, e.g., United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1064-66
(D.C. Cir. 1983).
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himself.31 Rule 609 reflects Congress's determination that it is fair to allow the
prosecutor to impeach a testifying defendant with prior convictions in order to
prevent him from appearing as one who has led an exemplary life. It seems
equally fair to allow the prosecutor to impeach a nontestifying defendant with
his prior convictions, where the defendant has chosen to tell his story through
his own hearsay statements rather than by taking the witness stand.32 Indeed, it
is arguably more important to allow impeachment in this context, because the
defendant has avoided the rigors of cross-examination by introducing his
hearsay statements rather than testifying.33
To put the matter somewhat differently, when Congress decided to allow
the criminal defendant to be impeached with his prior convictions under Rule
609, it struck a bargain of sorts. If the defendant asks the jury to listen to, and
believe, his own statement offered in aid of his defense, then the prosecutor
may tell the jury about the defendant's prior convictions, as long as they will
help the jury evaluate the defendant's credibility. When the defendant makes
his statement out of court, and then offers it in court in lieu of testifying, he is
still asking the jury to believe his statement offered in aid of his defense. A
principled application of Rule 609, therefore, requires that the defendant who
offers his out-of-court statement be held to the same bargain as the defendant
who makes his statement in court. In both instances, the defendant is asking the
jury to take his word and conclude that his statement is true.
2. Use of Rule 609 Against a Criminal Defendant Who Has Not
Affirmatively Placed His Credibility in Issue
The reach of Rule 806, however, is not expressly limited to situations in
which the defendant asks the jury to take his word. Rather, the clear import of
Rule 806 is that, once a person's hearsay statement (or statement defined in
Rule 801(d)(2)(C), (D), or (E)) has been admitted into evidence, the credibility
of the declarant may be attacked regardless of who may be the sponsor or
31 Noble, 754 F.2d at 1330-31; see also Lavson, 608 F.2d at 1130 ("By putting these
hearsay statements before the jury his counsel made Lawson's credibility an issue in the
case the same as if Lawson had made the statements from the witness stand.").
3 2 See United States v. McClain, 934 F.2d 822, 833-34 (7th Cir. 1991) ("ITihe
defendant should not be able to avoid completely this legitimate attack by, instead of
testifying, presenting only exculpatory statements made in the past.").
33 See generally Adam H. Kurland, Prosecuting 01' Man River: The Fifth Amendment,
the Good Faith Defense, and the Non-Testifyng Defendant, 51 U. PT. L. REv. 841, 910-
11 n.210 (1990) (noting that the effect of Rule 806 "is not inconsiderable. However, a
defendant may determine that it may not be as damaging as facing cross-examination.").
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source of the statement. 34 As a result, the text of Rule 806 permits a criminal
defendant to be impeached with his prior convictions in situations where
another party, rather than the defendant, has put the defendant's credibility in
issue by introducing his out-of-court statement. The policies underlying Rules
806 and 609, however, do not support impeachment in such a situation.
This situation can easily arise in the context of a joint trial. The facts of
United States v. Bovain35 are illustrative. In that case, seven defendants were
tried jointly for unlawful distribution of, and conspiracy to distribute, heroin.
At trial, the prosecution called Nichols, a coconspirator who was cooperating
with the government. Nichols testified about hearsay statements that Finch, a
defendant, had made about the drug activities of Rickett, a codefendant. Rickett
then impeached Finch's credibility, as a hearsay declarant, with evidence of
Finch's prior convictions for stolen money orders and a narcotics offense. 36
Finch never testified during the trial.
By its terms, Rule 806 permits impeachment in this situation: If Finch, the
defendant, had testified that Rickett, the codefendant, was involved in drug-
related activities, Rickett could have impeached Finch with his prior
convictions under Rule 609. Although Finch did not testify, the prosecutor
introduced Finch's out-of-court statement that Rickett was involved in drug-
related activities. That introduction made Finch a declarant; in essence, he was
a witness against Rickett, even though he did not testify. Under Rule 806, a
declarant may be impeached with prior convictions under Rule 609 as if the
declarant were a live witness. Therefore, under the text of the rules, it was
proper to allow Rickett to impeach Finch-a declarant and witness against
him-with Finch's prior convictions. 37
Whether this result is consistent with the policies underlying Rule 609,
however, is a much more troubling question, and it requires greater attention to
the problems of unfairness and prejudice thus created than it has yet received.
In analyzing the issue on appeal in Bovain, for instance, the Eleventh Circuit
gave these problems no more than passing recognition. Rather, the court
focused on the application of the text of Rule 806, which it found
"straightforward and logical," 38 only pausing to note that the situation was
34 FED. R. EviD. 806.
35 708 F.2d 606 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 898, and cert. denied, 464 U.S.
997, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983).
36 Id. at 613. The trial court refused to admit evidence of Finch's convictions for
forgery and escape. The reviewing court did not explain why the forgery conviction, which
would normally be automatically admissible under Rule 609(a)(2), was excluded. Id. at
613-14.
37 FED. R. EviD. 806.
38 Bovain, 708 F.2d at 613. The court elaborated: "Because Finch is a hearsay
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"unusual," and that the trial court had acted within its discretion based on "the
applicable policy considerations and rules. ... ."39
The disrupting effect of this unforeseen application of the rules on the
delicate balancing of policies that Congress sought to achieve through Rule
609, however, demands serious consideration. To that end, it is necessary to
look more closely at the competing policies and concerns that led Congress to
the careful compromise embodied in Rule 609.
In the congressional debate over Rule 609, there were basically two camps.
One camp favored giving counsel unrestricted rights to impeach any witness,
including the criminal defendant, with almost all prior convictions. 40 The other
camp advocated placing significant limitations on the right to impeach, limiting
impeachment to prior convictions involving dishonesty or false statement. 41
Advocates of limited impeachment rights focused on the risk of prejudice
that introduction of prior convictions creates for a criminal defendant. 42 This
risk of prejudice stems from the likelihood that the jury will misuse the
evidence. Rule 609 permits evidence of prior convictions to be used only for
impeachment purposes. Thus, the jury may only properly use such evidence to
help evaluate whether the witness is credible. 43 The jury may not use the prior
convictions as evidence that the defendant is the sort of person who would
declarant, his testimony may be treated like that of a witness (Rule 806), and as a witness,
he can be impeached (Rules 608, 609). Therefore, the certified records of Finch's prior
convictions were admissible for impeachment purposes (Rule 609)." Id.
39 Id. at 614.
40 More specifically, advocates of this view would have given counsel the right to
impeach any witness, including the criminal defendant, with any conviction for a crime
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year and with any conviction
(regardless of punishment) for a crime involving dishonesty or false statement. See 120
CONG. REc. 1414 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Hogan); id. at 37,076 (remarks of Sen.
McClellan). The Senate Bill embodied this view. Id. at 37,083.
41 See id. at 1419 (remarks of Rep. Dennis). The House Bill embodied this view. Id. at
2374, 2381, 2393-94.
42 See id. at 2379 (remarks of Rep. Wiggins) (admonishing the Congress should not
"underestimate for one moment the prejudicial impact of permitting an inquiry into
unrelated prior crimes by a man who is a party defendant in a criminal tial..... [The
admission of evidence of unrelated crimes when the defendant himself is on the stand,
borders upon a denial of due process... ."); id. at 37,080 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy)
(commenting that "all authorities agree that the greatest source of prejudice to a defendant is
a prior felony conviction"); id. at 2377 (remarks of Rep. Dennis); id. at 37,078 (remarks of
Sen. Hart).
43 FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee's note to Amended Rule 609(a) (amended
1990) (noting that the Rule is clear that "evidence offered under Rule 609 is offered only
for purposes of impeachment"); see also United States v. Gilliam, 994 F.2d 97, 99-100 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 335 (1993).
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commit the crime charged or who should be in prison regardless of whether he
is actually guilty of the particular crime charged.44
The danger, and therefore the risk of prejudice, lies in the difficulty of
making this distinction. It is widely agreed that a jury is unlikely to maintain
the distinction, even with the help of a limiting instruction.45 The problem
arises because, as Dean Nichol has explained, "[k]nowing the 'kind of person'
a defendant is for purposes of credibility cannot be separated from the
knowledge of character as applied to the determination of guilt or
innocence."46 As a result, despite any limiting instruction the judge might give,
there is a significant risk that the jury will use the evidence of prior crimes in
its determination of guilt.4
7
44 See FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee's note to Amended Rule 609(a)
(amended 1990); 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 29, § 42, at 153; 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER,
supra note 12, 609[02], at 609-30 to 609-31; James W. Betro, The Use of Prior
Convictions to Impeach Criminal Defendants-Do the Risks Outweigh the Benefits?, 4
ANTIOCH L.. 211, 211-12 (1986); Robert G. Spector, Impeaching the Defendant by His
Prior Convictions and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: A Half Step Forward and
Three Steps Backward, 1 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 247, 249 (1970).
45 See, e.g., Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir.) (Learned Hand, J.)
(explaining that it is unlikely that jurors can perform this type of "mental gymnastic"), cert.
denied, 285 U.S. 556 (1932); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 131-37 (1968);
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, I., concurring) ("The
naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury.... all
practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction."); Dunn v. United States, 307 F.2d 883,
886 (5th Cir. 1962) ("[Alfter the thrust of the saber, it is difficult to say forget the
wound.").
46 Nichol, supra note 12, at 419; see also Abraham P. Ordover, Balancing the
Presumptions of Guilt and Innocence: Rules 404(b), 608(b) and 609(a), 38 EMORY L.J. 135,
175-77 (1989); H. Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion,
Illogic, and Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 869 (1982).
47 See FED. R. EvID. 609 advisory committee's note to Amended Rule 609(a)
(amended 1990), which states:
ln virtually every case in which prior convictions are used to impeach the testifying
defendant, the defendant faces a unique risk of prejudice-i.e., the danger that
convictions that would be excluded under Fed. R. Evid. 404 will be misused by a jury
as propensity evidence despite their introduction solely for impeachment purposes.
ld.; see also United States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 488 (9th Cir. 1985) (discussing the risk
of prejudice that the defendant faces after impeachment with prior convictions), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1023 (1986); United States v. Fountain, 642 F.2d 1083, 1091 (7th Cir.)
(same), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 993 (1981); United States v. Avarello, 592 F.2d 1339, 1346
(5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 844 (1979); Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d
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The danger that the jury will misuse evidence of a defendant's prior record
is a real one, and the prejudice arising from misuse is substantial. Research
conducted in this area indicates that criminal defendants who are impeached
with their prior convictions are significantly more likely to be convicted,
especially if the prior crimes are similar to the one currently charged.48
Because the risks are so high and the prejudice so overwhelming,
congressional advocates of narrow impeachment rights argued forcefully that
the evidence rules should restrict this form of impeachment to convictions for
crimes, such as perjury, that bear directly on veracity. 49 This view was
936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (same), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968); 120 CoNG. REC.
37,078 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Hart); 1 MCCoRMICK, supra note 29, § 42, at 153.48 HARRy KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, TIIE AMERICAN JURY 159-60 (1966) (studying
the American jury system and finding that when the strength of the evidence was otherwise
constant, conviction rates were up to 27% higher when the jury knew that the defendant had
a prior conviction); Anthony N. Doob & Hershi M. Kirshenbaum, Some Empirical
Evidence on the Effect of s. 12 of the Canada Evidence Act upon an Accused, 15 CRIM.
L.Q. 88, 91-95 (1972-1973) (giving forty-eight mock jurors a breaking and entering fact
pattern, and informing half that the defendant had prior convictions-those jurors who
learned of the prior convictions gave the defendant a higher rating of guilt regardless of
whether they received limiting instructions); Note, To Take the Stand or Not to Take the
Stand: The Dilemma of the Defendant with a Criminal Record, 4 COLUM. I.L. & Soc.
PRoBs. 215, 218-19 (1968) (finding that 43% of trial judges and 98% of criminal defense
attorneys responding to a questionnaire thought that jurors could not follow an instruction to
consider prior crimes evidence only with respect to credibility and not guilt). See generally
Robert D. Okun, Character and Credibility: A Proposal to Realign Federal Rules of
Evidence 608 and 609, 37 VILL. L. REv. 533, 552-54 (1992) (citing, describing, and
evaluating a variety of studies).
49 For example, Representative Dennis argued:
[M]ost of the research on the subject indicates that a very large proportion of the
miscarriages of justice which occur are in those cases where either we prejudice the
man because he does take the witness stand in his own defense, or we scare him off and
he does not tell his story because of that rule [allowing impeachment with prior
convictions].
We amended this section [Rule 609], on my motion, to hold cross examination as
to prior to [sic] convictions down to previous convictions which do in fact bear on
credibility, that is convictions which involve falsehood or dishonesty and those only.
120 CONG. REC. 1419 (1974); see also supra note 42. Many commentators also advocate
significant restrictions on impeachment with prior convictions. See, e.g., James E. Beaver
& Steven L. Marques, A Proposal to Modify the Rule on Criminal Conviction Impeachment,
58 TEP. L.Q. 585, 619-21 (1985); James H. Gold, Sanitizing Prior Conviction
Impeaclhnent Evidence to Reduce Its Prejudicial Effects, 27 ARiz. L. REv. 691, 697-708
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reflected in the version of Rule 609 that originally passed the House of
Representatives. 50
On the other side of the debate, congressional proponents of broad leeway
to impeach the criminal defendant with his prior convictions stressed two
closely related points. First, they emphasized that it would be unfair to allow
the criminal defendant to present himself to the jury as a witness whose life has
been exemplary.5' Representative Hogan, a principal advocate of this view in
the House of Representatives, argued repeatedly that "it would be misleading to
permit the accused to appear as a witness of blameless life on those occasions
when the accused chooses to take the stand." 52
Second, congressional proponents of broad impeachment rights expressed
concern that, when a witness testifies, the jury should have the information it
needs to evaluate the witness's credibility. Senator McClellan, for instance,
asked:
[W]hy should one who has already been convicted of rape or murder and is
later being tried for armed robbery, not be able to be questioned about his
previous crimes, so that a jury might properly evaluate the credibility of the
testimony he is giving... [?]
If the jury is to be permitted to correctly determine what the true facts are
in a particular case, it must be permitted to have all the evidence before it
(1985); Nichol, supra note 12, at 418-21; Okun, supra note 48, at 568-72; Note, Character
Evidence by Any Other Nane... : A Proposal to Limit Impeachment by Prior Conviction
Under Rde 609, 58 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 762, 794-801 (1990).
50 120 CONG. REc. 2374, 2393-94 (1974). Under the House Bill, Rule 609(a) would
have stated: "For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has
been convicted of a crime is admissible only if the crime involved dishonesty or false
statement." ld.
51 Id. at 1414 (remarks of Rep. Hogan).
5 2 Id.; see also id. at 2376, 2380; MCCORMICK, supra note 29, § 42, at 153 ("Most
prosecutors would argue with much force that it would be misleading to permit the accused
to appear as a witness of blameless life, and this argument has prevailed widely."); 3
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 12, 609[02], at 609-29 (noting that this view has been
persuasive to some courts); Nichol, supra note 12, at 407-09 ("Fears have traditionally
been expressed that, absent the availability of prior crime impeachment, a criminal
defendant will be able to unfairly portray himself as a model citizen." The author proceeds
persuasively to challenge this view, arguing that jurors recognize both that the defendant has
an obvious motive to lie and that, having gotten this far in the system, there is a substantial
possibility that he is guilty.).
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that will enable it to judge the credibility of the witnesses who have given
testimony .... 53
These views prevailed in the Senate, which passed a version of Rule 609 that
would have made all felony convictions and all convictions for crimes
involving dishonesty or false statement automatically admissible for
impeachment purposes. 54
In the end, of course, Congress reached a compromise between the
opposing views, so that convictions for crimes involving dishonesty or false
statement were made admissible without qualification, and convictions for other
crimes were made admissible only if the crime was a felony and the
prosecution could demonstrate that the conviction's probative value outweighed
the risk of prejudice to the defendant. 55 But again, this compromise was
founded on the assumption that Rule 609 would apply only against testifying
witnesses. 56 The question, therefore, is whether it is consistent with
congressional intent and the notions of fairness that informed it to apply Rule
609 through Rule 806 against a defendant who has done nothing to place his
credibility in issue. In order to analyze that question, it is important to
understand the options that the criminal defendant normally enjoys under Rule
609.
In a criminal trial, if the defendant does not testify, he cannot be impeached
with his prior convictions. 57 And that is so, even though, by pleading not
guilty, the defendant is in a sense asking the jury to believe him. This principle
53 120 CONG. REC. 37,076 (1974). Other members of Congress echoed the same
concerns. See id. at 2381 (remarks of Rep. Lott); id. at 2380 (remarks of Rep. Hogan); id.
at 37,080 (remarks of Sen. Thurmond). Judicial opinions also reflect this concern. See
United States v. Garber, 471 F.2d 212, 214-15 (5th Cir. 1972) ("The present rationale for
admitting prior conviction evidence for impeachment purposes is that the jury should be
informed about the character of a witness who asks the jury to believe his testimony.");
State v. Duke, 123 A.2d 745, 746 (N.H. 1956) (opining that, when a criminal defendant
testifies, "he asks the jury to accept his word. No sufficient reason appears why the jury should
not be informed what sort of person is asking them to take his word. In transactions of everyday
life this is probably the first thing that they would wish to know.").
54 120 CONG. REC. 37,083 (1974).
55 FED. R. EviD. 609(a); see supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
56 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
57 See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 706 F.2d 860, 862 (8th Cir.) (stating that the
defendant "was not, of course, required to take the stand. By his election to do so, he
voluntarily exposed himself to impeachment by these prior felony convictions."), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 917 (1983); see also FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee's note to
Amended Rule 609(a) (amended 1990); United States v. Fountain, 642 F.2d 1083, 1092
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 993 (1981); Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 939-
41 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968).
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reflects the strong tradition in our justice system that a person should be tried
based on the facts of the case, not on the basis of his character.
58
Thus, the criminal defendant who has a prior record is understood to have
a clear choice between testifying (with the attendant risk that he will be
impeached with his prior convictions) and not testifying (thereby avoiding
introduction of his prior convictions, but forgoing the opportunity to explain
his defense himself). The choice is never an easy one, for:
If [the] defendant takes the stand, he faces impeachment by proof of his prior
convictions and the consequent danger that the jurors instead of considering the
convictions as relevant to credibility, will regard them as evidence of guilt,
despite instructions to the contrary. If the defendant remains silent, statistics
indicate that the jury is likely to conclude that he is guilty.5 9
Nevertheless, the defendant is afforded this choice, which means that, if he
believes that jury knowledge of his prior convictions would fatally prejudice his
case, he can protect himself from admission of his record by opting not to
testify. 60
58 See FED. R. EvID. 404(b) ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith."); see also Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948). Justice
Jackson explained:
The state may not show defendant's prior trouble with the law, specific criminal acts, or
ill name among his neighbors, even though such facts might logically be persuasive that
he is by propensity a probable perpetrator of the crime. The inquiry is not rejected
because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the
jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and
deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge.
Id. (footnote omitted); Beaver & Marques, supra note 49, at 585 ("The rule against
admitting evidence of prior convictions as substantive proof stems from the Anglo-American
prejudice, a very noble prejudice, in favor of trying cases instead of trying people."); Okun,
supra note 48, at 533; Uviller, supra note 46, at 868. See generally 1 MCCoRMICK, supra
note 29, § 188, at 793.
59 3 WEiNsTEiN & BERGER, supra note 12, 609[02], at 609-31; see also 120 CONG.
REC. 37,080 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy); Spector, supra note 44, at 250 ("The
defendant is 'damned if he does and damned if he doesn't.'").
60 See, e.g., United States v. Holloway, 1 F.3d 307, 311 (5th Cir. 1993) ("Since Rule
609(a) permits the use of a prior conviction for the impeachment of a defendant's testimony,
by opting not to testify Holloway could have precluded the government from introducing
the evidence that he was a convicted felon.. . ."); see also Fountain, 642 F.2d at 1092;
Gordon, 383 F.2d at 940.
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Application of Rule 609 through Rule 806 against a nontestifying defendant
who did not affirmatively place his credibility in issue, however, completely
upsets this balance and strips the defendant of the opportunity even to make the
difficult choice not to testify. In Bovain, for instance, the defendant had chosen
not to testify. 61 Although the opinion does not specify why he chose as he did,
it is at least a fair assumption that, as in the broad run of cases, the defendant
feared the jury's reaction to his substantial criminal record, which included a
conviction similar to the crime charged. 62 When a defendant chooses not to
testify for that reason, he chooses not to place his credibility in issue, and he
pays a considerable price for the privilege (i.e., the risk that the jury will
assume that he is afraid to testify because he is guilty).
Under the Bovain application of Rules 806 and 609, however, the
defendant who has done nothing to place his credibility in issue-indeed, has
actively sought to keep it from becoming an issue-loses the protection that
silence normally affords him. Put more starkly, because the prosecution has
sought to enhance its case against a codefendant by using the defendant's
hearsay statements, the defendant faces the substantial-and now unavoidable-
prejudice of impeachment with prior convictions. 63
In enacting Rule 609, Congress expressed its judgment that imposing these
risks on the criminal defendant is fair when the defendant testifies in his own
behalf. But there is a critical difference between a case in which the defendant
testifies in his own behalf, and one in which the defendant does nothing to put
his own credibility in issue. In the first case-the standard Rule 609 context-
the defendant has, in a sense, "opened the door." By asking the jury to believe
his own testimonial account, the defendant has affirmatively placed his
credibility in issue; that act justifies subjecting the defendant to rigorous
impeachment under the policy resolution embodied in Rule 609. In the second
case, however, the defendant has not "opened the door." He has not
affirmatively placed his credibility in issue; on the contrary, he has consciously
sought to shield himself by declining to testify at trial. In this context, there are
61 United States v. Bovain, 708 F.2d 606, 613 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 898,
and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 997, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983). In Bovain, a
prosecution witness testified about incriminating statements that Finch-a defendant-had
made about Rickett-a codefendant. Rickett was then permitted to impeach Finch's
credibility with his prior convictions under Rule 806. For a more detailed description of
Bovain, see supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
62 Bovain, 708 F.2d at 613. Finch was charged with distribution of, and conspiracy to
distribute, heroin. His criminal record included convictions for a narcotics offense, stolen
money orders, forgery, and escape. Id.
63 In a joint trial, the defendant can also become a hearsay declarant if a codefendant's
witness repeats one of the defendant's hearsay statements.
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no grounds for Congress's concern that the defendant could try to mislead the
jury by presenting himself as "a witness of blameless life." 64 This important
policy consideration underlying Rule 609 thus would not justify impeachment
in this situation.
There are, however, some grounds for Congress's related concern that the
jury should have sufficient information to evaluate a witness's credibility. 65
Rule 609 reflects Congress's judgment that a witness's prior convictions are
probative evidence on the issue of credibility. Rule 609, however, is premised
on the assumption that the rule would come into play only if the defendant
chose to testify. This premise seems to have been critical to Congress's shaping
of the rule; during the debates, members of Congress repeatedly returned to the
fact that a criminal defendant could protect himself from introduction of his
prior convictions by not testifying at his trial.66 When this premise is no longer
sound-because the defendant has not testified and has not otherwise placed his
testimonial credibility in issue-the risk that the jury will misuse the evidence
of prior convictions has much less to counterbalance it.
Once again, it is useful here to consider this problem from the standpoint
of the bargain struck by Congress in Rule 609. Under the terms of that
bargain, if the defendant chose to place his testimonial credibility in issue, then
the prosecution would be permitted to impeach the defendant with prior
convictions that were sufficiently probative of credibility. But if the defendant
feared that the impact of his prior convictions would be too great, then he could
prevent their introduction by not placing his credibility in issue. This exchange,
however, is greatly undermined when one of the critical elements-the
defendant's decision to place his testimonial credibility in issue-is no longer
present.
In that situation, the concern that the jury should receive relevant
information to evaluate the witness's credibility must give way to the greater
concern that the criminal defendant will be unduly prejudiced by introduction
of his prior convictions. It is true that the litigant adversely affected by the
defendant's out-of-court statement may want and need to impeach his
credibility.67 That need alone, however, should not justify subjecting the
64 120 CONG. REC. 1414 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Hogan); see supra note 52 and
accompanying text.
65 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
66 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
67 The federal circuit courts have held that, in some circumstances, preventing a
criminal defendant from impeaching the credibility of the declarant of an out-of-court
statement admitted for its truth can violate the Confrontation Clause. See United States v.
Barrett, 8 F.3d 1296, 1299 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Moody, 903 F.2d 321, 329
(5th Cir. 1990); Smith v. Fairman, 862 F.2d 630, 638 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490
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defendant to potentially insurmountable prejudice, a form of prejudice which
threatens the very presumption of innocence that is afforded to the criminal
defendant. 68
For these reasons, Rule 806 should be amended to prevent introduction of
a criminal defendant's prior convictions in these circumstances. More
specifically, Rule 806 should be amended to provide that, if the declarant is the
accused, then the declarant may be impeached with prior convictions only if he
has affirmatively placed his credibility in issue.
U.S. 1008 (1989). Thus, if the litigant adversly affected by the defendant's out-of-court
statement is also a criminal defendant, then prohibiting that defendant from impeaching the
declarant-his codefendant-with prior convictions might violate the Confrontation Clause.
United States v. Burton, 937 F.2d 324, 329 (7th Cir. 1991) (indicating that refusing to allow
a criminal defendant to impeach a declarant with prior convictions can violate the
Confrontation Clause, but holding that the defendant had waived the issue and that there
was not plain error in the district court's refusal to allow such impeachment in that case).
But see United States v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 64, 67-68 & n.2 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that
refusing to allow the defendant to impeach the codefendants whose out-of-court statements
had been admitted against him with their prior convictions did not violate the Confrontation
Clause).
If the defendant's inability to impeach a codefendant with prior convictions were to
violate the Confrontation Clause, the prosecution would, presumably, be required either to
forgo use of the out-of-court statement or to sever the trial. Cf. United States v. Bruton, 391
U.S. 123, 143-44 (1968) (White, J., dissenting) (describing the practical consequences of
the Court's holding that introduction of a codefendant's confession that implicates, but is
inadmissible against, the defendant violates the Confrontation Clause). Even if the inability
to impeach with prior convictions does not amount to a constitutional violation, however,
such a restriction on impeachment may cause grave prejudice to the adversely affected
defendant. This prejudice arises because the adversely affected defendant would be deprived
of a powerful form of impeachment, which may hinder his efforts to undermine the
credibility of a witness against him. For this reason, even if there is not a constitutional
violation, the court should consider whether the restriction on impeachment is so prejudicial
to the adversely affected defendant that the trial should be severed. See FED. R. CRIM. P.
14 (enabling the court to grant severance when joinder is prejudicial). The distinct questions
of whether the facts in a particular case might violate the Confrontation Clause or whether,
in the absence of such a constitutional violation, the trial court should nonetheless grant
severance to avoid grave prejudice to the defendant, present difficult issues that are beyond
the scope of this Article.
68 In Robinson, the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's decision prohibiting the
defendant from impeaching codefendants-whose out-of-court statements had been admitted
against him-with their prior convictions. In doing so, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that
there "is a danger of prejudicing the presumption of innocence of that co-defendant by
admission of evidence of his prior crimes, such evidence being generally inadmissible to
show the character or guilt of the co-defendant." Robinson, 783 F.2d at 67; see also United
States v. Hall, 854 F.2d 1036, 1043 (7th Cir. 1988).
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3. Detennination of When a Criminal Defendant Has Affirnatively
Placed His Credibility in Issue
The remaining issue is when a criminal defendant should be understood to
have affirmatively placed his credibility in issue, such that he should be subject
to impeachment under the conjunction of Rules 806 and 609. At either end of
the spectrum of possible cases, the answers are clear. If, on the one hand, the
defendant introduces his own hearsay statements in his case-in-chief, as the
defendant did in Noble, then the defendant should be subject to impeachment
with prior convictions under Rule 806.69 If, on the other hand, another party
(the prosecutor or a codefendant) introduces the defendant's out-of-court
statements, as was the case in Bovain, then the defendant should not be subject
to impeachment with prior convictions under Rule 806.70
The difficult cases, of course, fall in the middle of the spectrum. These are
cases in which the defendant's out-of-court statements are introduced as a result
of questioning by the defense counsel, but are not affirmatively introduced as
part of the defendant's case-in-chief. This type of situation would likely arise in
one of two ways.
First, the defense counsel might raise or elicit the defendant's out-of-court
statements in cross-examination of a prosecution witness. Suppose, for
instance, that the prosecution witness had testified on direct examination that
the defendant had made certain incriminating statements, or had engaged in
69 See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
70 See supra notes 34-68 and accompanying text. If the prosecution calls a witness
who testifies on direct examination to an exculpatory out-of-court statement that the
defendant made, then the defendant likewise should not be subject to impeachment with
prior convictions by the prosecution. In this situation, even though the statement may
be helpful to the defense, it was not the defendant who elicited it; rather, it was the
prosecution that elicited the statement from a prosecution witness. From the defendant's
perspective, this situation is equivalent to the situation in Bovain; in both, the defendant did
nothing to put his credibility in issue. Cf. Tubbs v. State, No. B14-89-00560-CR, 1990 Tex.
App. LEXIS 681 (Mar. 29, 1990). In Tubbs, the prosecution used the state counterpart to
Rule 806 to impeach the defendant with his prior convictions after a prosecution witness
testified on direct examination about an exculpatory out-of-court statement made by the
defendant. On appeal, the court found error, stating: "If the state chose to offer this
statement for its veracity, their sole reason for doing so would be to introduce the otherwise
in admissible [sic] convictions of the appellant. We choose not to believe this strategy was
the intention of the state .-. ." Id. at *3-4.
This same result would be reached if the proposal advanced in Part IV of this Article
were adopted. If the prosecution introduced the defendant's out-of-court statement-
inculpatory or exculpatory-the statement would qualify as an individual admission under
Rule 801(d)(2)(A).
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certain incriminating conduct. If the prosecution witness were then to testify on
cross-examination about exculpatory statements that the defendant had also
made, the question would arise as to whether the defendant had placed his
credibility in issue.71 In such situations, the answer will necessarily turn on the
facts and circumstances of the particular case. Nonetheless, it does seem
possible in most instances to draw a principled distinction between cases in
which the defendant can fairly be considered to have placed his credibility in
issue, and those in which he should not be considered to have placed his
credibility in issue.
This distinction lies in the defense counsel's need to raise or elicit the
defendant's own hearsay statement on cross-examination. In some instances,
the defense counsel will need to do so in order to correct a misleading
impression that may have been created by the prosecution witness's testimony
on direct examination. If, for example, the witness testified on direct
examination that the defendant made certain incriminating statements, then the
defense counsel might well need to ask the witness whether the defendant had
contemporaneously made any other statements. In doing so, the defense
counsel's purpose would be to dispel the misleading impression created by the
partial account that the prosecution had elicited. In such instances, the defense
should not be considered to have placed the defendant's credibility in issue.72
By contrast, in some situations the defense counsel may choose to raise or
elicit the defendant's own hearsay statements during cross-examination of a
prosecution witness (rather than during the defendant's case-in-chief) for her
own strategic reasons, and not in an effort to correct a distorted impression
created by the prosecution. This situation is functionally equivalent to the
situation in which the defense counsel introduces the defendant's statements
71 A situation of this nature arose in United States v. Lawson, 608 F.2d 1129, 1129-30
(6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1091 (1980). In that case, during cross-examination
of a prosecution witness (a Secret Service agent), defendant Lawson's counsel brought out
the fact that Lawson had consistently denied any involvement in the alleged counterfeiting
scheme. Had the prosecution sought to impeach Lawson with his prior convictions based on
that exchange alone, the court would have been confronted with the question whether
Lawson had affirmatively placed his credibility in issue. Lawson's counsel, however, also
later introduced a written statement in which Lawson denied all complicity in the
counterfeiting activities, and in doing so, he affirmatively placed Lawson's credibility in
issue. Id. at 1130; see also supra notes 26-33.
72 The underlying principle here is directly analogous to that underlying the "rule of
completeness." FED. R. EviD. 106 advisory committee's note. Both are founded on the
notion that the litigant should be given greater leeway to introduce evidence that is
necessary to "explain and shed light on the meaning of the part already received." 1
McCoRmIcK, supra note 29, § 56, at 228; see also LOuJiSELL & MuELLER, supra note 5, §
49, at 352-60; 1 WFNSTIN & BERGER, supra note 12, 106[01]-[02], at 106-2.1 to -21.
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during her case-in-chief; the only difference is the timing. When the impetus
for introducing the statement is something other than the need to dispel a
misleading impression by providing greater context, the defense can fairly be
considered to have placed the defendant's credibility in issue.73
The second situation in which the defendant's hearsay statements might be
introduced as a result of questioning by the defense counsel, but not
affirmatively introduced as part of the defendant's case-in-chief, would occur if
the witness were to surprise the defense with testimony about the defendant's
hearsay statements. If, for example, a defense witness on direct examination (or
a prosecution witness on cross-examination) were unexpectedly to recount a
hearsay statement that the defendant had made, the question would arise as to
whether the defendant had placed his credibility in issue.
A possible approach in this situation would be to consider the defense to
have affirmatively introduced the statement, unless the defense moves to strike
it from the record. Such an approach has the advantage of ease of
administration, for it would eliminate any need for the trial court to undertake
the difficult task of determining whether the witness's testimony was indeed
unexpected and spontaneous. Yet it has the significant disadvantage of forcing
the defense to discredit (by asking to have stricken) a favorable statement that
the defendant himself made, an apparently significant action to which the jury
would naturally tend to ascribe undue importance. 74
73 Another possible approach would be to employ a standard similar to that which the
Supreme Court adopted in United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980). In Havens, the
Court held that the government may use illegally obtained evidence to impeach a
defendant's testimony on cross-examination, if the defendant's statements were "made in
response to proper cross-examination reasonably suggested by the defendant's direct
examination ...." Id. at 627-28. In the context of Rule 806, courts could employ a similar
standard by refusing to permit the defendant to be impeached with prior convictions if the
defendant's hearsay statements were introduced in response to proper cross-examination
reasonably suggested by the witness's direct examination. The disadvantage of this approach
is that it is vague and easily manipulated. Courts have widely divergent views as to what
constitutes the scope of direct examination, and those views would likely inform any
decision as to whether the cross-examination was reasonably suggested by the witness's
direct examination. See generally FED. R. EVID. 611(b); 1 McCoRMICK, supra note 29,
§§ 21-27, at 83-95. In addition, "even the moderately talented" defense counsel should
generally be able to find a way to introduce evidence on cross-examination that she would
otherwise introduce during her case-in-chief. Havens, 446 U.S. at 632 (Brennan, I.,
dissenting) (citing Walden v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 66 (1954)).
74 See generally ROBERT H. KLONOFF & PAUL L. COLBY, SPONSORSHIP STRATEGY 17-
45 (1990) (describing and explaining, as a matter of trial tactics and strategy, how a jury
tends to magnify or diminish the credibility of evidence depending on which party presents
the evidence and the circumstances of its presentation).
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In these more difficult cases, therefore, the better approach would seem to
be to require the prosecution to attempt to block the introduction of the hearsay
statement as a prerequisite to impeaching the defendant with prior convictions.
The prosecution could do so either by objecting to the admissibility of the
statement or by indicating to the court, out of the jury's hearing, that if the
statement were not withdrawn, the prosecution would seek to impeach the
defendant with his prior convictions. Such a requirement would put the defense
to a clear choice: withdraw the statement or affirmatively sponsor it. If the
defense chose to withdraw the statement, then the prosecution could, of course,
request a limiting instruction admonishing the jury to disregard the statement. 75
If, on the other hand, the defense chose to press for admission of the statement,
then it could fairly be considered to have placed the defendant's credibility in
issue.76
In both the easy and more difficult cases, therefore, the core principle for
applying Rule 609 through Rule 806 is that the criminal defendant should not
be subject to impeachment with his prior convictions unless he can fairly be
judged to have affirmatively placed his credibility in issue through the
introduction of his own hearsay statements. 77 Rule 806 should be amended to
rely explicitly on this principle. The explanatory notes to the rule also should
provide more detailed guidance about how courts would be expected to
exercise their discretion in applying this principle in the more difficult cases, as
described above.
C. Proposed Amendment of Rule 806
Rule 806 thus should be amended to provide that, where the declarant is a
75 See 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 29, § 52, at 201.
76 Although requiring the prosecution to object to evidence as a prerequisite to
impeachment is somewhat unusual, it seems a salutary measure in this situation. Imposing
such a requirement will serve to put the defense on notice that, if it succeeds in admitting
the defendant's hearsay statements, the defendant's credibility will be laid open to attack
with prior convictions. The requirement thus will allow the defense counsel to withdraw the
statement without appearing to discredit it; it also will protect the unwary defendant from
potentially devastating impeachment in situations where the defense did not affirmatively
seek to place the defendant's credibility in issue.
77 Some commentators have persuasively argued that, with respect to impeachment of
criminal defendants, Rule 609 should be restricted to situations "where a defendant
affirmatively places his or her character for truthful or law-abiding behavior in issue."
Okun, supra note 48, at 537, 568-70; see also Beaver & Marques, supra note 49, at 619-
21. This Article's use of the concept of a defendant who "affirmatively places his credibility
in issue" is different; it refers to the issue of credibility necessarily raised by the defendant's
decision to testify.
[Vol. 56:495
EVIDENCE RULE 806
criminal defendant, the declarant may be impeached with prior convictions only
if he has affirmatively placed his credibility in issue. The following proposed
amendment is designed to serve this purpose:
When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in Rule 801(d)(2),
(C), (D), or (E), has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the
declarant may be attacked, and if attacked may be supported, by any
evidence which would be admissible for those purposes if declarant
had testified as a witness. If the declarant is an accused, the credibility
of the declarant may be attacked with prior convictions only if the
declarant has affirmatively placed the declarant's credibility in issue.
Evidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant at any time,
inconsistent with the declarant's hearsay statement, is not subject to
any requirement that the declarant may have been afforded an
opportunity to deny or explain. If the party against whom a hearsay
statement has been admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party
is entitled to examine the declarant on the statement as if under cross-
examination.78
III. RULE 806 AND THE BAN ON ExrRiNSIC EVIDENCE
The combination of Rule 806 with the other impeachment rules also creates
difficult problems in the context of impeachment with specific instances of
conduct showing untruthfulness under Rule 608(b).79 As was the case with
Rule 609, these problems stem from the grafting of Rule 806-which is
designed to permit impeachment of a declarant who is not a testifying witness-
onto a rule designed to permit impeachment of a witness who testifies in court.
Rule 608 authorizes and regulates one of the methods of impeachment
provided in the Federal Rules.80 In general, this impeachment method entails
7 8 If this proposed amendment to Rule 806 were adopted, the explanatory notes should
include some guidance for trial courts on how to determine whether the declarant has
affirnmatively placed his credibility in issue. See supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
79 Rule 806 permits a declarant to be impeached under Rule 608. See FED. R. EVID.
806 advisory committee's note (citing Rule 608 in explaining the scope of Rule 806); United
States v. Barrett, 8 F.3d 1296, 1299 (8th Cir. 1993) ("Federal Rule of Evidence 806
permits the impeachment of a hearsay declarant's reputation for truthfulness."); United
States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 569-70 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004
(1989); see also 4 LOUIELL & MUELLER, supra note 5, § 501, at 1240-49; 1 MCCORMICK,
supra note 29, § 324.2, at 370-71.
80 This impeachment method is one of a variety permitted by the Federal Rules and the
common law. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 613 (impeachment with inconsistent statements);
FED. R. EviD. 609 (impeachment with prior convictions); United States v. Abel, 469 U.S.
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introducing evidence that the witness has a poor character for veracity.81 More
specifically, Rule 608 permits the attacking party to use reputation and opinion
evidence and to inquire into specific instances of conduct, subject to the general
requirement that the evidence must be probative of truthfulness or
untruthfulness.82
Rule 608(b) also states an important limitation on the use of such evidence.
Although Rule 608(b) permits inquiry on cross-examination, the rule expressly
prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence to prove specific instances of conduct
showing untruthfulness. 83 As a result, the impeaching party may ask the
witness about specific instances of conduct on cross-examination, but if the
45 (1984) (impeachment with evidence of bias). Impeachment pursuant to Rule 608 is
permissible in both civil and criminal cases. Although the cases cited in this section of the
Article tend to be criminal cases, the principles discussed apply in civil cases as well.
81 FED. R. EVID. 608. This method of impeachment is also authorized and regulated
by Federal Rule of Evidence 609, which governs the use of prior convictioas as a means of
showing that the witness has a poor character for veracity.
82 Rule 608 provides:
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a witness may
be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to
these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the
character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation
evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for
the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, other than conviction of
crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may,
however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be
inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character
for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-
examined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not
operate as a waiver of the accused's or the witness' privilege against self-incrimination
when examined with respect to matters which relate only to credibility.
FED. R. EvWD. 608.
83 Rule 608(b) provides, in pertinent part: "Specific istances of the conduct of a
witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, other than
conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence."
FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
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witness denies the misconduct, she must take the witness's answer; the
impeaching party may not use extrinsic evidence to prove that the witness did
engage in such conduct. 84
To some extent, of course, the prohibition on the use of extrinsic evidence
limits the effectiveness of this method of impeachment. In the normal setting,
however, where the attacking party is impeaching a testifying witness, the
ability to question the witness about specific instances of conduct is nonetheless
a powerful impeachment tool. By asking, specifically and repeatedly, about
alleged misconduct, the attacking party is able to convey the information to the
jury, thus creating suspicion and doubt.85
It is clear that Rule 608(b) was crafted with the understanding that the
attacking party would be impeaching a testifying witness, who could be asked
about relevant specific instances of conduct. This is underscored by the text of
the rule itself, which provides that specific instances of conduct "may not be
84 See Abel, 469 U.S. at 55 (stating that Rule 608(b) "limits the inquiry to cross-
examination of the witness, however, and prohibits the cross-examiner from introducing
extrinsic evidence of the witness' past conduct"); United States v. Brooke, 4 F.3d 1480,
1484 (9th Cir. 1993) (refusing admission of extrinsic evidence of a specific instance of
conduct for the purpose of impeaching credibility); United States v. Martz, 964 F.2d 787,
789 (8th Cir. 1992) (explaining that Rule 608(b) "forbids the use of extrinsic evidence to
prove that the specific bad acts occurred"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 823 (1993); United
States v. Weiss, 930 F.2d 185, 199 (2d Cir.) (stating that Rule 608(b) "expressly precludes
the use of extrinsic evidence to prove specific instances of misconduct"), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 842 (1991); United States v. Frost, 914 F.2d 756, 767 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that
defense counsel is "'stuck with' the response given on cross-examination" under Rule
608(b)); United States v. May, 727 F.2d 764, 765 (8th Cir. 1984) (stating that "specific
instances of a witness's conduct used for impeachment may not be proved by extrinsic
evidence"); cf. Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961, 971 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that extrinsic
evidence may be used, but only if the witness admits that he engaged in the specific instance
of conduct).
85 4 LOUmSELL & MuELLER, supra note 5, § 306, at 243 ("[I]ndependent evidence of
misconduct by a witness is often unnecessary as a means of conveying to the jury a caution
as to his truthfulness, for questions alone may impart such a caution, despite denials by the
witness."); Ordover, supra note 46, at 144 ("The great danger in [impeachment with
specific instances under Rule 608(b)] is that the insinuation of wrong-doing in the question
may be adopted by the jury, which cannot satisfy itself as to the truth or falsity of the
allegation."); see also Brooke, 4 F.3d at 1484 (holding that the attacking lawyer may
continue to press the point even after the witness has denied engaging in the alleged
misconduct); United States v. Ling, 581 F.2d 1118, 1121 (4th Cir. 1978) (same); 3
WEINsTE & BERGER, supra note 12, 608[05], at 608-30 to -31 ("Courts often
summarize the no extrinsic evidence rule by stating that 'the examiner must take his
answer.' This phrase ... is misleading insofar as it suggests that the cross-examiner cannot
continue pressing for an admission.") (citations omitted).
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proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, ... be inquired into on
cross-examination of the witness." 86
When Rule 608(b) is applied through Rule 806, however, this
understanding is no longer valid, because Rule 806 authorizes impeachment of
declarants who are not testifying witnesses. If the declarant does not testify, as
will often be the case, the impeaching party will not be able to inquire about
specific instances of conduct on cross-examination because there will be no
witness to cross-examine. In that situation, Rule 608(b)'s ban on extrinsic
evidence may preclude any use at all of this impeachment weapon. By its
terms, Rule 806 authorizes impeachment only with "evidence which would be
admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness." 87
Currently, therefore, Rule 806 would appear to forbid the use of extrinsic
evidence of specific instances to impeach a nontestifying declarant, because if
the declarant were a testifying witness, Rule 608(b) would forbid the use of
extrinsic evidence.
On the other hand, it is possible that Rule 806 could be interpreted to
modify the ban on extrinsic evidence contained in Rule 608(b). Rule 806 is
designed to permit a party to impeach a declarant as if she were a testifying
witness, and Rule 608(b) permits a testifying witness to be impeached with
specific instances of conduct showing untruthfulness. Rule 806 thus could be
understood to allow the general type of impeachment authorized in Rule
608(b), making allowances for necessary alterations in form. Although this
construction stretches the language of Rule 806, the Second Circuit apparently
adopted this approach in United States v. Friedman,88 reasoning that Rule
608(b) "limits such evidence of 'specific instances' to cross-examination. Rule
806 applies, of course, when the declarant has not testified and there has by
definition been no cross-examination, and resort to extrinsic evidence may be
the only means of presenting such evidence to the jury. "89
86 FED. R. EviD. 608(b).
87 FED. R. EVID. 806. Courts have consistently interpreted this language to restrict
impeachment under Rule 806 to that which is permissible under the other impeachment
rules. See United States v. Finley, 934 F.2d 837, 839 (7th Cir. 1991) (Rule 806 "does not
allow the use of evidence made inadmissible by some other rule. Rule 806 extends the
privilege of impeaching the declarant of a hearsay statement but does not obliterate the rules
of evidence that govern how impeachment is to proceed."); United States v. Moody, 903
F.2d 321, 329 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting that the "scope of impeachment parallels that
available if the declarant had testified in court"); cf. State v. Evans, 522 N.W. 2d 554, 557-
59 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that, under the state counterpart to Rule 806, the
credibility of a nontestifying declarant could not be attacked with specific instances of
conduct).
88 854 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004 (1989).
89 Id. at 570 n.8; see also GRAHAM, supra note 5, § 806.1, at 1006 n.4; 4 LOUISELL &
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In order to determine how Rule 806 should be applied, the critical issue is
whether, as a matter of principle, the prohibition on extrinsic evidence should
extend to impeachment of a nontestifying declarant when Rule 608(b) is used
through Rule 806. Resolution of that issue turns on whether the restriction that
Rule 608(b) imposes on impeachment of testifying witnesses is sufficiently
important that it should also be imposed on impeachment of nontestifying
declarants. It is thus necessary to understand the reasons that underlie Rule
608(b)'s ban on extrinsic evidence.
A. The Dangers of Extrinsic Evidence
Rule 608 is widely understood to codify the common law rules that
governed impeachment with character evidence. 90 The common law, like Rule
608(b), permitted the impeaching party to ask a witness about conduct showing
untruthfulness, but forbade the impeaching party from proving such conduct
with extrinsic evidence.91
It has long been recognized that the primary reason for the prohibition on
extrinsic evidence is to avoid confusion of issues. This reason is based on the
concern that allowing the impeaching party to introduce extrinsic evidence (that
is, to call additional witnesses) to prove the specific instances of conduct might
result in a "mini-trial" on that point. As Dean Wigmore explained: "There are
two chief considerations; first, each additional witness introduces the entire
group of questions as to his qualifications and his impeachment... ; secondly,
this additional mass of testimony on minor points tends to overwhelm the
material issues of the case and to confuse the tribunal in its efforts to
MUELLER, supra note 5, § 501, at 1241.
Only one other federal court-a district court in the Seventh Circuit-has specifically
addressed the issue. United States v. Finley, No. 87 CR 364-1, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6175, at *4 n.1 (N.D. Il1. May 19, 1989), affd, 934 F.2d 837 (7th Cir. 1991). Finding "no
contrary authority," the district court indicated that it would permit extrinsic evidence in the
Rule 806 context. The integrity of the district court's determination on this point, however,
is suspect. Although the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ultimate holding that
the evidence offered under the conjunction of Rule 806 and Rule 608(b) was inadmissible
hearsay, it took care to admonish that Rule 806 "does not allow the use of evidence made
inadmissible by some other rule." Finley, 934 F.2d at 839. Taken seriously, the court's
admonition would, of course, require enforcement of Rule 608(b)'s ban on extrinsic
evidence.
90 See, e.g., 1 MCCoRMIcK, supra note 29, § 41, at 137-41; 3 WEiNSTEIN & BERGER,
supra note 12, 608[05], at 608-28.
91 See 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 29, § 41, at 141; 3A JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 979 (Chadboum rev. 1970).
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disentangle the truth upon those material points." 92 Courts have emphasized
that extrinsic evidence is excluded for this reason. In United States v. Martz, 93
for instance, the court stated: "The purpose of barring extrinsic evidence is to
avoid holding mini-trials on peripherally related or irrelevant matters."94
Dean Wigmore also offered a second reason for the ban on extrinsic
evidence: the prevention of unfair surprise. 95 The concern is that if the
attacking party were to introduce false evidence of misconduct, the witness
would have little ability to rebut it. Although the possibility of surprise is
generally insufficient to support a rule excluding evidence, the danger here is
that the impeaching party might falsely allege misconduct of any nature, over
any part of the witness's life. False allegations of misconduct might put the
witness at too great a disadvantage, for he could not be "expected to be
prepared to disprove every alleged act of his life."96
Commentators have suggested that a third concern further serves to justify
the ban as well. This concern is based on the risk of prejudice that a party
suffers when the jury learns of his, or even his witness's, misdeeds. 97 When a
witness is impeached with a specific instance of conduct showing
untruthfulness, the jury may properly use the evidence only to evaluate the
92 3A WIGMORE, supra note 91, § 979, at 826; see also 3 WEiNsTEiN & BERGER,
supra note 12, 608[05], at 608-29; William G. Hale, Specific Acts and Related Matters as
Affecting Credibility, 1 HAsTINGs L.J. 89, 89-90 (1950) (extrinsic evidence is excluded
because of "(1) confusion of issues; (2) undue consumption of time; (3) unfair surprise since
such collateral issue cannot be anticipated and, hence, no preparation can be made to meet
it").
93 964 F.2d 787 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 823 (1993).
94 Id. at 789; see also United States v. May, 727 F.2d 764, 765 (8th Cir. 1984)
("Impeachment by extrinsic evidence threatens to expand the trial to an inquiry into
collateral matters which could distract and confuse the jury."); Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d
961, 971 (3d Cir. 1980) ("The purpose of rule 608(b)'s extrinsic evidence ban, as noted, is
'to avoid minitrials on wholly collateral matters which tend to distract and confuse the
jury.'"); United States v. Banks, 475 F.2d 1367, 1368 (5th Cir. 1973); Foster v. United
States, 282 F.2d 222, 223 (10th Cir. 1960) ("the witness is not on trial, his character is not
in issue and extrinsic testimony in respect thereto tends to confuse the issues and promote
unfair surprise and multifariousness").
95 3A WIGMoRE, supra note 91, § 979, at 827.
96 Id. Courts also have noted the prevention of unfair surprise as a reason for the rule
banning extrinsic evidence. See, e.g., Banks, 475 F.2d at 1368; Foster, 282 F.2d at 223.
97 See, e.g., 4 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 5, § 306, at 242-43 (noting that the
third purpose for the ban is that "it reduces the risk of prejudice which unavoidably attends
the introduction of evidence of specific bad acts, since juries are likely to misuse such
evidence ... ."); 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 12, 608[05], at 608-29 (explaining
that Rule 608(b)'s ban on extrinsic evidence "is mandated by considerations of policy
against unduly extending the trial, surprise and prejudice"); Okun, supra note 48, at 544.
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witness's credibility. It may not use the evidence substantively, as evidence that
the party is the sort of person who would commit the charged offense (or, in a
civil case, the act complained of), or who deserves to be punished regardless of
whether he committed the wrong at issue.98 The risk of prejudice lies in the
substantial likelihood that the jury will be unable to confine its use of the
evidence to evaluation of credibility, but will use it substantively as well.99
For these various reasons, Rule 608(b) expressly prohibits the attacking
party from using extrinsic evidence to prove specific instances of conduct when
impeaching a testifying witness. The issue with respect to Rule 806 is whether
these reasons are sufficient to support enforcement of the ban when doing so
will effectively preclude any use of this impeachment tool. In order to make
that determination, it is important to weigh the countervailing considerations
that arise in the special situation of the nontestifying declarant.
B. Impeaching the Nontestifying Declarant
The drafters of Rule 806 recognized that the declarant of an out-of-court
statement admitted for its truth is in effect a witness and that the jury needs to
evaluate the declarant's credibility, just as it needs to evaluate the credibility of
a witness who testifies in court. 100 Rule 806 thus seeks to allow a party to
impeach the credibility of a declarant as if the declarant were a testifying
witness.
If the specific restrictions contained in Rule 608(b) are enforced when that
rule is applied in conjunction with Rule 806, however, the impeaching party
will not be able to impeach the nontestifying declarant to the same extent that
the impeaching party would be able to impeach a testifying witness. This is so
because Rule 608(b) limits impeachment with specific instances of conduct
showing untruthfulness to the single method of cross-examination. If the
deelarant does not testify, the attacking party will not have an opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant about relevant misconduct. As a result, the
impeaching party effectively will be precluded from impeaching the declarant
with such misconduct.
If the attacking party cannot impeach the declarant with specific instances
of conduct, she is clearly worse off than she would have been if her opponent
had called the declarant to testify. Unless she is able (and willing) to call the
declarant as her own witness, she now has no way of bringing to the jury's
98 See, e.g., United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246, 1248-49 (2d Cir. 1978); 3
WEINSTEN & BERGER, supra note 12, 608[011, at 608-11.
99 See, e.g., 3 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 5, § 305, at 239; 3 WEINSTEIN &
BERGER, supra note 12, 608[011, at 608-11.
100 FED. R. EvID. 806 advisory committee's note.
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attention damaging evidence of the declarant's untruthful conduct. Instead, the
attacking party will be limited to using opinion or reputation evidence about the
declarant's character for untruthfulness, which is often significantly less
effective than evidence of specific instances of conduct. 10 1
It is true that, if the declarant is available to testify, the attacking party has
the right to call and cross-examine him. 1°2 But this burden seems both
significant and unfair. As Professors Louisell and Mueller argue: "The
impeaching party ought not to be put to the burden of calling the declarant to
the stand even if he is available, since his adversary has adduced the statement
which gave rise to the need for impeachment." 103
In addition, if Rule 806 is applied to enforce the prohibition on extrinsic
evidence, parties might be encouraged to offer hearsay evidence rather than live
testimony. For example, if a party felt that a witness was vulnerable to attack
under Rule 608(b), that party might attempt to insulate the witness from this
form of impeachment by offering his out-of-court statements, rather than
calling him to testify. If, however, the attacking party were allowed to impeach
a nontestifying declarant with extrinsic evidence of untruthful conduct, the
incentive to use hearsay evidence would be removed. Further, it might
encourage parties to call available declarants to testify, because doing so would
limit the attacking party to inquiring about specific instances of conduct on
cross-examination.
These considerations militate strongly in favor of modifying Rule 608(b)'s
ban on extrinsic evidence when the attacking party seeks to impeach a
nontestifying declarant with specific instances of conduct showing
untruthfulness. On the other side, of course, are the original reasons for the
ban: the concerns about confusion, surprise, and prejudice. These reasons,
however, do not support enforcement of the ban outside the setting of the
testifying witness who is subject to cross-examination. Indeed, even with
respect to a testifying witness, these reasons do not serve to justify a blanket
exclusion of evidence of specific instances of conduct, but rather serve only to
101 Cf FED. R. EvID. 405 advisory committee's note ("Of the three methods of
proving character providedi by the rule, evidence of specific instances of conduct is the most
convincing."); see also supra note 85 and accompanying text.
102 The final sentence of Federal Rule of Evidence 806 states: "If the party against
whom a hearsay statement has been admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party is
entitled to examine the declarant on the statement as if under cross-examination." FED. R.
EvID. 806.
103 4 LOUIsELL & MUELLER, supra note 5, § 501, at 1241. Professors Louisell and
Mueller thus urge that "Rule 806 should be read as modifying the otherwise-applicable Rule
Cm this case, Rule 608) to the extent of permitting extrinsic evidence of such misconduct."
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justify exclusion of extrinsic evidence of such conduct. In other words, these
reasons have been considered sufficient only to limit the amount and type of
impeachment with specific instances of conduct, not to ban it altogether. 104
When the declarant does not testify, the use of extrinsic evidence is not
simply a secondary, additional means of conveying the impeaching information
to the jury: it is the only means of doing so.105 In this situation, in light of the
considerations favoring such impeachment, the traditional ban on the use of
extrinsic evidence must yield. 106
This is not to say that the dangers of confusion, surprise, and prejudice no
longer exist when extrinsic evidence is offered to impeach a nontestifying
declarant. They do exist, but they should be dealt with on an individualized
basis, rather than with an across-the-board prohibition. For this reason, the trial
court should have broad discretion to determine whether and to what extent to
permit the use of extrinsic evidence in this context.
In exercising this discretion, trial courts will be engaged in a new and
sometimes difficult task, because they will no longer be working under the
mandate of a blanket rule excluding extrinsic evidence. The trial court will, of
course, need to consider the particular facts and circumstances in each
individual case. There are, however, certain factors that trial courts should
generally consider. These factors include the need for impeachment in light of
104 See 3 WEiNsTEIN & BERGER, supra note 12, 608[05], at 608-36; see also 3A
WIGMORE, supra note 91, § 979, at 823-28 (denominating the reasons of confusion and
surprise as "reasons of auxiliary policy").
105 The Second Circuit emphasized this point in concluding that the impeaching party
should be permitted to use extrinsic evidence when applying Rule 608(b) through Rule 806.
United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 570 n.8 (2d Cir. 1988) ("Rule 806 applies, of
course, when the declarant has not testified and there has by definition been no cross-
examination, and resort to extrinsic evidence may be the only means of presenting such
evidence to the jury."), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004 (1989).
106 Faced with a similar problem, the Advisory Committee determined that the need
for effective impeachment of a declarant is sufficiently important to justify eliminating
important restrictions on impeachment with inconsistent statements. Federal Rule of
Evidence 613(b), governing impeachment with inconsistent statements, provides in part:
"Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless
the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same." FED. R. EvID. 613(b).
Recognizing that these requirements would preclude use of this impeachment weapon
against a nontestifying hearsay declarant, the Advisory Committee stated: "The result of
insisting upon observation of this impossible requirement in the hearsay situation is to deny
the opponent, already barred from cross-examination, any benefit from this important
technique of impeachment." FED. R. EVID. 806 advisory committee's note. Rule 806 thus
directs: "Evidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant at any time, inconsistent with
the declarant's hearsay statement, is not subject to any requirement that the declarant may
have been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain." FED. R. EvID. 806.
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the importance of attacking the declarant's credibility with the extrinsic
evidence, which will turn largely on the importance of the declarant's out-of-
court statements and the availability of other forms of impeaching evidence; the
quality of the impeaching evidence, in terms of its strength and reliability; the
amount of time likely to be consumed, which will depend on the nature of the
impeaching evidence and the extent to which it will be disputed; the potential
confusion of issues; the likelihood of unfair surprise; and the risk of
prejudice.' 07
These factors will play out differently in individual cases. The facts of
United States v. Friedman,10 8 however, provide a useful example. In that case,
the defendant was charged with various racketeering activities in conjunction
with the operation of the New York City Parking Violations Bureau. At trial,
the prosecution introduced numerous statements by a local politician named
Donald Manes under the hearsay exemption for statements of a
coconspirator. 10 9 The defendant then sought to attack the credibility of Manes,
the declarant, with evidence that Manes had initially lied to police about a
recent suicide attempt, falsely telling them that the slash wounds in his wrist
and ankle had been inflicted by unknown assailants. The defendant offered to
prove that Manes had lied about the suicide attempt by presenting the testimony
of the assistant district attorney to whom Manes had lied, as well as a videotape
of Manes reading a public statement in which he admitted that he had lied.110
On these facts, if the court were to find that the evidence was sufficiently
probative of untruthfulness under Rule 608(b),' 1 the court would then need to
determine whether it should permit the defendant to introduce the extrinsic
evidence. In making that determination, two factors seem particularly
important. First, the prosecution had introduced multiple statements that
Manes-a coconspirator-had made which implicated the defendant. The
defendant's need to impeach Manes's credibility effectively thus appears to
have been significant. Second, Manes himself had publicly admitted that he had
lied about the incident. The impeaching evidence thus seems highly reliable and
unlikely to have generated much additional rebuttal evidence, thereby
107 In order to give the judge sufficient room to exclude extrinsic evidence, Rule 806
should expressly provide the district judge with broad discretion, making it clear that the
judge need not employ the high standard for exclusion contained in Rule 403.
108 854 F.2d 535, 569-70 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004 (1989).
109 FE-D. R. EviD. 801(d)(2)(1).
110 Friedman, 854 F.2d at 569.
111 In Friedman, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that the incident
was not sufficiently probative of untruthfulness to meet the requirements of Rule 608(b). Id.
at 570. The court also indicated that its decision on this point was influenced by its concern
that the jury would also use the false story as evidence of Manes's guilty state of mind. Id.
[Vol. 56:495
EVIDENCE RULE 806
substantially reducing the risk of a time-consuming and distracting mini-trial on
the issue. In addition, the suicide attempt was recent and notorious, which
reduces the possibility of unfair surprise.
In circumstances such as these, therefore, it seems that the trial court
should exercise its discretion to permit the use of extrinsic evidence. If,
however, the facts were altered so that, although Manes was suspected of
having lied, he had continued to insist on his initial story, the trial court might
well refuse to allow the extrinsic evidence. In this situation, there would be a
great risk that the trial would devolve into a lengthy tussle over whether Manes
had in fact lied about the incident, with each side calling witnesses to testify to
their versions of the events and to dispute the testimony of the opposing
witnesses. In such circumstances, the trial court would need to evaluate
carefully whether the defendant's need to impeach Manes's credibility was
sufficiently great to warrant this risk of delay and confusion, and whether the
additional proof on the issue could appropriately be restricted in some manner.
Although determining whether to permit the use of extrinsic evidence to
impeach a nontestifying declarant will in some circumstances be a difficult task
for the trial court, the considerations favoring such impeachment justify the
effort. Thus, Rule 806 should direct the trial court to use its discretion in
determining whether to allow the attacking party to use extrinsic evidence when
she seeks to impeach a nontestifying declarant with specific instances of
conduct pursuant to Rule 608(b). 112 The explanatory notes to Rule 806 also
should provide more detailed guidance about how the courts should exercise
this discretion, by setting out the factors discussed above and encouraging the
trial courts to work to minimize any confusion, surprise, or prejudice that
112 The opportunity to use extrinsic evidence, however, should be limited to situations
in which the declarant does not testify. There is no need to give the attacking lawyer an
additional weapon when the declarant is on the witness stand, available for questioning
about specific instances of conduct showing untruthfulness.
This reasoning also applies to impeachment with inconsistent statements. If the
declarant testifies, then the normal requirements of Rule 613 should apply: unless justice
otherwise requires, the witness must be afforded the opportunity to explain or deny. In
interpreting the Ohio counterpart to Rule 806, the court in State v. Mathias, No. 91CA31,
1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 1458 (Mar. 31, 1994), concluded:
The waiver of the [Ohio] Evid.R. 613(B) foundational requirement in [Ohio] Evid.R.
806 merely removes an impossible obstacle when the hearsay declarant does not testify
and thus, cannot be confronted with the inconsistent statement. Accordingly, where, as
here, a hearsay declarant also testifies as a witness, [Ohio] Evid.R. 806 does not excuse
the [Ohio] Evid.R. 613 foundational requirement ....
Id. at *9-10 (citation omitted).
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might attend the introduction of extrinsic evidence.
Although this matter can safely be left within the trial court's discretion in
most instances, there is one situation where the risk of prejudice is so high, and
the effect of prejudice is so dramatic, that the bar against extrinsic evidence
should remain firmly in place. This situation arises when the criminal defendant
is the declarant subject to impeachment, but the defendant himself has not
affirmatively placed his credibility in issue either by testifying or by
introducing his own hearsay statements. In this situation, the rules of evidence
should protect the criminal defendant from the potentially fatal prejudice of
having the jury learn of his prior misdeeds. The reasons for this conclusion are
elaborated in Part II of this Article, which addressed impeachment with prior
convictions. 113
C. Proposed Amendment of Rule 806
Rule 806 thus should be amended to provide the trial court with discretion
to allow the use of extrinsic evidence to impeach a nontestifying declarant with
specific instances of conduct pursuant to Rule 608(b). A proposed amendment
to the text of Rule 806 follows:
When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in Rule 801(d)(2),
(C), (D), or (E), has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the
113 See supra notes 34-68 and accompanying text. Although evidence of prior
convictions may be somewhat more prejudicial than evidence of misdeeds which did not
result in conviction-because the conviction conclusively proves that the defendant
committed the misdeed-both produce the same type and quality of prejudice. See Okun,
supra note 48, at 536 n.11 ("Although most of the legal commentary has focused on
impeachment with prior convictions, many of the criticisms of such impeachment apply
with similar force to impeachment with prior bad acts that were not the subject of
convictions."); Ordover, supra note 46, at 141-50 (calling for a closer alignment of Rule
608(b), governing impeachment with prior misdeeds, and Rule 609, governing
impeachment with prior convictions). Impeachment of a criminal defendant with prior
misdeeds under the conjunction of Rules 806 and 608(b) thus should be subject to the same
restriction proposed in Part II for impeachment with prior convictions.
An alternative approach would be to leave this matter within the discretion of the trial
court. The argument in favor of this approach is that prior misdeeds can come in many
forms; sometimes they are not even criminal in nature. As a result, the likelihood and extent
of prejudice that the criminal defendant would face if impeached with prior misdeeds will
vary depending on the particular misdeed at issue. If this approach were adopted, however,
the trial court's discretion should be sharply confined with language in the explanatory notes
directing trial courts to act with caution in permitting a criminal defendant who has not
affirmatively placed his credibility in issue to be impeached with prior misdeeds.
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declarant may be attacked, and if attacked may be supported, by any
evidence which would be admissible for those purposes if declarant
had testified as a witness. If the declarant does not testify, the court
may, in its discretion, permit the use of extrinsic evidence to prove
specific instances of conduct that are probative of truthfidness or
untruthfidness, as provided in Rule 608(b), as a means of attacking or
supporting the credibility of the declarant. Evidence of a statement or
conduct by the declarant at any time, inconsistent with the declarant's
hearsay statement, is not subject to any requirement that the declarant
may have been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain. If the party
against whom a hearsay statement has been admitted calls the declarant
as a witness, the party is entitled to examine the declarant on the
statement as if under cross-examination.1 14
IV. APPLICATION OF RULE 806 TO PARTY ADMISSIONS
An additional concern with respect to Rule 806 involves the proper extent
of its application to declarants of statements admitted as party admissions under
Rule 801(d)(2). As written, Rule 806 specifies that it applies to two categories
of declarants: (1) any declarant of a hearsay statement; and (2) any declarant of
a statement admitted because it was authorized by the party-opponent, or made
by the party-opponent's agent or employee, or made by a coconspirator within
the terms of Rule 801(d)(2)(C), (D), or (E).115
114 If this proposed amendment to Rule 806 is adopted, the explanatory notes should
include guidance for the trial court on how to exercise its discretion in determining whether
to permit the use of extrinsic evidence. See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
Rule 806 also should be amended to make clear that the criminal defendant who has
not affirmatively placed his credibility in issue is not subject to impeachment with specific
instances of conduct showing untruthfulness. This limitation on impeachement can best be
accomplished by expanding the revision proposed in Part II to state: "If the declarant is an
accused, the credibility of the declarant may be attacked with specific instances of conduct
that are probative of untruthfulness, as provided in Rule 608(b), or with prior convictions,
only if the declarant has affirmatively placed the declarant's credibility in issue." See supra
note 78 and accompanying text. The explanatory notes to Rule 806 should also provide
guidance for the trial court in determining whether the declarant has affirmatively placed his
credibility in issue. See supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text. A comprehensive
proposal for revising the text of Rule 806 is set out in the Conclusion of this Article.
115 FED. R. EVID. 806; see also FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(2)(C) (exempting "a statement
by a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the subject" from
hearsay when offered against a party); FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(2)(D) (exempting "a statement
by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or
employment, made during the existence of the relationship" from hearsay when offered
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By its terms, however, Rule 806 does not apply to declarants of statements
admitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(A) or (B). Consequently, Rule 806 does not
authorize impeachment of the declarant when the statement is admitted either as
the party-opponent's own statement (an "individual admission") or as a
statement that the party-opponent has adopted (an "adoptive admission"). 16
The issue is whether this exclusion is a sensible limitation on impeachment
of nontestifying declarants, in light of the goals of Rule 806 and the structure of
the evidence rules generally. As discussed earlier, the drafters of Rule 806
recognized that the declarant of an out-of-court statement admitted for its truth
is, in effect, a witness. 117 Through Rule 806, they thus sought to allow a party
to impeach the credibility of a declarant as if he were a testifying witness.1 18 In
evaluating whether declarants of statements admitted as individual and adoptive
admissions should also be subject to impeachment under Rule 806, therefore,
the critical question is whether it is appropriate to treat a nontestifying declarant
as if he were a testifying witness in the particular setting of individual and
adoptive admissions. Although there has been considerable misunderstanding
and confusion in Congress and the courts over this question, 1 9 careful analysis
suggests that the current text of Rule 806 embodies the most satisfactory
resolution of the competing considerations.
A. Application of Rule 806 to Individual and Adoptive Admissions
Consider the following situation. In a criminal trial, the prosecutor calls a
witness who testifies that the defendant told him that the defendant had
committed the crime. The prosecutor is able to introduce this testimony as an
individual admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(A) because the witness is repeating
the defendant's own statement, and it is being offered against the defendant. 120
The question that immediately arises under Rule 806 is whether the
defendant would have a right to impeach his own credibility as the declarant of
against a party); FaD. R. EviD. 801(d)(2)(E) (exempting "a statement by a coconspirator of
a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy" from hearsay when offered
against a party).
116 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A) (exempting "the party's own statement, in either an
individual or a representative capacity" from hearsay when offered against a party); FED.
R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B) (exempting "a statement of which the party has manifested an
adoption or belief in its truth" from hearsay when offered against a party).
117 FED. R. EVID. 806 advisory committee's note; see supra note 4 and accompanying
text.
118 FED. R. EviD. 806 advisory committee's note.
119 See infra part IV.A.1-2.
120 FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(2)(A). A similar situation could arise in a civil case as well.
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this statement. In many cases, of course, the defendant would have no interest
in impeaching his own credibility before the jury. In some circumstances,
however, the defendant might well wish to exercise this option. For instance,
in the situation described, the defendant might wish to impeach his own
credibility by introducing a prior inconsistent statement-that is, a statement in
which he denied any involvement with the crime.121 Alternatively, the
defendant might wish to suggest that his admission of guilt was false by
showing that he has a reputation for untruthfulness-not a happy alternative,
certainly, but one that may be preferable in a particular case to allowing a
direct admission of guilt to go unchallenged.
Further, a small change in the facts described gives rise to a related
question. Suppose a prosecution witness testifies that the defendant said that he
had committed the crime, but that he had acted under duress. Again, the
prosecutor could introduce this testimony as a party admission under Rule
801(d)(2)(A), but now, because the statement has an exculpatory component,
the prosecutor might wish to impeach the defendant's credibility. This
impeachment would be possible, at least with respect to a testifying witness,
because the rules permit any party to attack the credibility of a witness,
"including the party calling the witness." 122
The plain language of Rule 806 would bar impeachment in both of these
situations. Rule 806 specifically provides that it applies to the declarant of "a
hearsay statement, or a statement defined in Rule 801(d)(2), (C), (D), or
(E)." 123 The rule makes no reference to statements defined as individual or
adoptive admissions in Rule 801(d)(2)(A) and (B). Under ordinary canons of
statutory construction, the specific omission of subsections (A) and (B),
coupled with the specific inclusion of the remaining subsections of Rule
801(d)(2), would dictate that courts interpret Rule 806 not to apply to
declarants of statements admitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(A) and (B).124
121 See, e.g., United States v. Dent, 984 F.2d 1453, 1460 (7th Cir.) (following the
prosecutor's introduction of the defendant's guilty plea to a related state charge under Rule
801(d)(2)(A), the defendant sought to impeach his own credibility through Rule 806 by
introducing statements that he had made to his lawyer which were inconsistent with the
guilty plea), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 169, and cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 209 (1993).
122 FED. R. EviD. 607. Again, a similar situation could arise in a civil case as well.
123 FED. R. EVID. 806.
124 The relevant canon of statutory construction is expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
which admonishes that the expression of specific situations encompassed by the provision
acts to exclude others not so expressed. See, e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics
Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 113 S. Ct. 1160, 1163 (1993) (applying the canon in
interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)); Camp v. Gress, 250 U.S. 308, 314-15
(1919) (applying the canon in interpreting the Judicial Code); see also 2A NORMAN J.
SINGER, SuTHERLAND STATUTORY CoNsTRucrIoN § 47.23 (5th ed. 1992).
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The question raised here, however, is whether Rule 806 should give
litigants any right to engage in this type of impeachment. In evaluating this
question, it is necessary first to consider any reasons that Congress may have
had for crafting the text of Rule 806 to exclude individual and adoptive
admissions.
1. The Drafting of Rule 806
When Congress initially considered Rule 806, the rule was in the form
proposed by the Advisory Committee. At that point, the rule was drawn more
narrowly, providing only for impeachment of declarants of hearsay
statements. 125 In evaluating the proposed rule, however, Congress recognized
that it contained a problematic gap, which stemmed from the structure of the
hearsay rules themselves and, more particularly, from the way in which the
Federal Rules of Evidence classify party admissions.
Under the Federal Rules, statements that meet the formal definition of
hearsay, but nonetheless are admissible as party admissions, are not classified
as hearsay exceptions, but rather are defined in Rule 801(d) as not being
hearsay at all. 126 As a result, the language of proposed Rule 806, which
referred only to declarants of hearsay statements, would not have reached
statements defined as party admissions under Rule 801(d)(2).
Recognizing this problem, Congress amended the proposed rule to specify
that it also applies to statements "defined in Rule 801(d)(2), (C), (D), or
(E)." 127 This amendment extended the scope of Rule 806 to allow
125 See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183,
329 (1973).
126 Rule 801(d) provides, in pertinent part:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if -
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is
(A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or representative capacity or (B) a
statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a
statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the
subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within
the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship,
or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of
the conspiracy.
FED. R. EVD 801(d)(2).
127 FD. R. EVID. 806. The Senate Judiciary Committee's Report explained:
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impeachment of the declarant when a statement is admitted because it was
authorized by a party-opponent, or made by a party-opponent's agent or
employee, or made by a coconspirator within the terms of Rule 801(d)(2). 128
At the same time, however, Congress consciously omitted from Rule 806
any reference to statements admitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(A) and (B). As a
result, Rule 806 does not authorize impeachment of the declarant when the
statement is admitted either as an individual admission or as an adoptive
admission. 129 The question at hand is whether Congress had any principled
reason for carving such declarants out of Rule 806. The legislative history of
the rule strongly suggests that Congress did not. Rather, the legislative history
indicates that Congress excluded declarants of individual and adoptive
admissions because it misunderstood how the impeachment rules operate with
respect to the parties in a case.
In Congress, it was the Senate Judiciary Committee that recognized the
need to include in Rule 806 a reference to statements defined as nonhearsay in
Rule 801(d)(2). In its Report, the Committee explained that it had included
statements introduced under Rule 801(d)(2)(C), (D), and (E) to ensure that Rule
806 would reach them.130 The Committee then went on to explain why it had
Rule 801 defines what is a hearsay statement. While statements by a person authorized
by a party-opponent to make a statement concerning the subject, by the party-
opponent's agent or by a coconspirator of a party-see rule S01(d)(2)(c), (d), and (e)-
are traditionally defined as exceptions to the hearsay rule, rule 801 defines such
admission by a party-opponent as statements which are not hearsay. Consequently, rule
806 by referring exclusively to the admission of hearsay statements, does not appear to
allow the credibility of the declarant to be attacked when the declarant is a
coconspirator, agent or authorized spokesman. The committee is of the view that such
statements should open the declarant to attacks on his credibility. Indeed, the reason
such statements are excluded from the operation of rule 806 is likely attributable to the
drafting technique used to codify the hearsay rule, viz some statements, instead of being
referred to as exceptions to the hearsay rule, are defined as statements which are not
hearsay. The phrase "or a statement defined in rule 801(d)(2)(c), (d), and (e)" is added
to the rule in order to subject the declarant of such statements, like the declarant of
hearsay statements, to attacks on his credibility.
NOTES OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
22 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7068-69 (footnote omitted).
128 See FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(2)(C)-(E); see supra note 126.
129 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A)-(B); see supra note 126.
130 NOTES OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 127, at 7069.
Because party admissions were defined as nonhearsay in Rule 801(d)(2), Rule 806 would
not have reached them if it had only authorized impeachment of declarants of hearsay
statements. See supra text accompanying note 127.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
not included a reference to individual and adoptive admissions admitted under
Rule 801(d)(2)(A) and (B): "The committee considered it unnecessary ...
because the credibility of the party-opponent is always subject to an attack on
his credibility [sic]." 131
The Senate Judiciary Committee's assumption that a party's credibility is
always subject to attack is inexplicable. A party may be impeached only if she
testifies, or if her out-of-court statement is admitted such that Rule 806
applies.132 The Committee's report clearly indicates, however, that it excluded
Rule 801(d)(2)(A) and (B) from the text of Rule 806 based on its mistaken
assumption that a party is always subject to impeachment.
In enacting Rule 806 with the Senate Judiciary Committee's language,
Congress did not elaborate on the reasons for excluding declarants of individual
and adoptive admissions. 133 In the absence of any further explanation,
Congress may have joined in or simply failed to notice the Senate Judiciary
Committee's mistaken assumption that there was no need to include such
declarants in the rule. In any event, however, Congress appears not to have
had, or at least it did not articulate, any reason based in sound policy for
excluding declarants of individual and adoptive admissions from the scope of
Rule 806.
2. The Confusion Among and Within the Courts
The apparent lack of rationale for the exclusion of individual and adoptive
admissions has generated confusion in the federal courts. The Seventh Circuit's
treatment of the issue is illustrative. Three times in three successive years, that
court addressed the question of whether Rule 806 applies to declarants of
individual and adoptive admissions-with markedly inconsistent results.
131 NOTES OF THE SENATE COMm. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 127, at 7069 n.28.
132 4 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 5, § 500, at 1238 n.82. It is surprising that
the Senate Judiciary Committee misunderstood this basic point because there was extensive
discussion in both the House and the Senate with respect to the fact that a criminal defendant
cannot be impeached with his prior convictions unless he testifies. See, e.g., 120 CONG.
REC. 2376 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Hogan); id. at 2377 (remarks of Rep. Dennis); id. at
2378 (remarks of Rep. Brasco); id. at 2381 (remarks of Rep. Lott); id. at 37,080 (remarks
of Sen. Kennedy).
133 Id. at 37,083. The Senate Judiciary Committee's recommendation was accepted by
the full Senate without further explanation. The Committee of Conference for both
chambers then adopted the Senate amendment, also without further explanation as to the
exclusion of individual and adoptive admissions. Id. at 39,942. The Committee did state,
however, that it was adopting the Senate's version of the rule as that version "conforms the
rule to present practice." 1d.
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In the first of these cases, United States v. Mcaain,134 the Seventh Circuit
refused to countenance the defendant's argument that he was entitled to
impeach the declarant of an adoptive admission under Rule 806.135 In doing so,
the court relied on the plain language of the rule, emphasizing that "Rule 806
says nothing of 801(d)(2)(B), which governs non-hearsay statements adopted by
the party against its interest." 136
The following year, the Seventh Circuit revisited the issue in United States
v. Velasco. 137 In Velasco, however, the court departed from the language of
the rule, relying instead on the contrary indications of congressional intent in
the legislative history. Without mentioning its previous decision in McCain,
the court announced:
Although [Rule 806's] language does not specifically include statements
defined in 801(d)(2)(A), the rule under which [the defendant's] statement came
in, Rule 806 is not inapplicable: "The committee considered it unnecessary to
include statements contained in rule 801(d)(2)(A) and (B)-the statement by the
party-opponent himself or the statement of which he has manifested his
adoption-because the credibility of the party-opponent is always subject to an
attack on his credibility [sic]."138
134 934 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1991).
135 In McClain, the prosecutor introduced tape recordings of incriminating
conversations between the defendant and a government informant. McClain, the defendant,
sought to impeach the informant's credibility under Rule 806. The trial judge refused to
permit the impeachment, on the ground that the informant's statements were not hearsay
because they were admitted only for the context that they provided, and not for their truth.
On appeal, McClain argued that because the jury treated the informant's statements as
adoptive admissions, he was entitled to impeach the informant under Rule 806. Id. at 832-
33.
136 Id. at 833. In rejecting the defendant's argument, the Seventh Circuit also held that
impeachment was improper because the trial judge admitted the statements to provide
context only. Id.
Even if the court had agreed that the informant's statements were adoptive admissions,
and that the declarant of an adoptive admission is impeachable under Rule 806, there is a
further question of whether the declarant for impeachment purposes is the informant, who
uttered the statement, or the defendant, who adopted it. This issue is analyzed infra at notes
147-59 and accompanying text.
137 953 F.2d 1467 (7th Cir. 1992). In Velasco, the prosecution introduced a portion of
the defendant's postarrest statement under Rule 801(d)(2)(A). The defendant sought to
introduce the rest of the statement under Federal Rule Evidence 106, the rule of
completeness. Although the Seventh Circuit ultimately upheld the trial judge's decision to
refuse admission of the remaining portion, the court noted that admission of that portion
would subject the defendant to impeachment under Rule 806. Id. at 1473-76.
138 Id. at 1473 n.5 (quoting NOTES OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra
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The Seventh Circuit then reaffirmed its position that Rule 806 applies to
declarants of statements admitted as individual and adoptive admissions the
following year in United States v. Dent.139 In that case, the court stated, "we
have already held that this rule also applies to a party's own statement as
defined in Rule 801(d)(2)(A) or (B) in Velasco." 140
The Seventh Circuit's holdings in Velasco and Dent stand in direct conflict
with its earlier decision in McCain. The confusion within the Seventh Circuit
is especially curious, since two of the three judges on the panel that decided
McCain (including its author) were on the panel in Velasco. 141 The Seventh
Circuit's treatment of the issue is, however, symptomatic of the general
confusion among the circuit courts of appeals that have addressed the issue. 142
It is clear that this confusion can be attributed, at least in part, to the
tension between the plain language of Rule 806 and the conflicting indications
note 127, at 7069 n.28 (emphasis added)).
139 984 F.2d 1453 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 169, and cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 209 (1993). In Dent, the prosecutor introduced the defendant's guilty plea to a related
state charge as an individual admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(A). The defendant then sought
to impeach his own credibility through Rule 806 by introducing statements that he had made
to his lawyer which were inconsistent with the guilty plea. Id. at 1460.
140 Id.
141 n Mcadin, Judge Cudahy wrote the opinion, in which Judges Easterbrook and
Posner joined. (judge Easterbrook wrote a brief concurring opinion on a different point.) In
Velasco, Chief Judge Bauer wrote the opinion, in which Judges Cudahy and Easterbrook
joined. (Judge Cudahy wrote a brief concurring opinion on a different point.) Judges
Easterbrook and Bauer were also on the panel in Dent.
142 The Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue in United States v. Price, 792 F.2d 994
(11th Cir. 1986). In Price, the prosecutor introduced taped conversations between the
defendant and a government informant. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial judge
should have permitted him to impeach the informant's credibility under Rule 806, because
the informant's statements were admitted as adoptive admissions. Id. at 996-97. Although
the court ultimately held that the statements were admitted for context only, it was careful to
note that "the utterer of words which have been adopted as an admission by the defendant,
is subject to impeachment under FRE 806." Id. at 997.
The Ninth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion with respect to this issue in United
States v. Becerra, 992 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1993). In Becerra, a prosecution witness had
testified that Angela, a government informant, had told him, in the defendant's presence,
that the defendant knew the cocaine source. The defendant then sought to attack Angela's
credibility under Rule 806, but the trial judge refused to permit it. On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the trial judge's ruling on alternate grounds. First, the court held that
Angela's statement was not hearsay because it was admitted as foundation and not for its
truth. Alternatively, however, the court held that "[e]ven if admitted for its truth, the
statement was an adoptive admission, which is not hearsay.... Rule 806 does not apply."
Id. at 965 (citations omitted).
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of congressional intent in the legislative history. 143 The courts' confusion,
however, is also due to the lack of attention given the issue. The courts which
have held that Rule 806 does not apply to adoptive admissions introduced
under Rule 801(d)(2)(B) have, at most, noted that "Rule 806 says nothing of
801(d)(2)(B)." 144 The courts which have held that Rule 806 does apply to
individual and adoptive admissions introduced under Rule 801(d)(2)(A) and (B)
have either assumed the point, 145 or have merely quoted from the legislative
history, without offering any discussion of the resulting contradiction with the
text of the rule. 146 None of the courts has engaged in a thoughtful analysis of
whether any principled reasons exist for either refusing or permitting
impeachment of declarants of statements admitted as individual and adoptive
admissions.
B. Analysis of Whether Rule 806 Should Permit Impeachment of
Declarants of Individual and Adoptive Admissions
The task, then, is to evaluate whether Rule 806 should permit impeachment
of the declarant of a statement admitted as an individual or adoptive admission.
A threshold problem in this evaluation is identifying who constitutes the
declarant in the context of both individual admissions and adoptive
admissions. 147 The identity of the declarant is important because the declarant's
status as a party to the case, as opposed to a nonparty, will have a significant
influence on any policy considerations.
143 Since the disagreement among the courts turns on whether they rely on the plain
language of Rule 806 or its legislative history, it appears inevitable that the disagreement
will continue unless the problem is addressed in Rule 806 itself. C. Wisconsin Public
Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 609-10 n.4 (1991) (discussing the proper role of
legislative history in interpreting statutes); id. at 2488-90 (Scalia, J., concurring) (taking a
contrary view of the proper role of legislative history); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S.
87, 97-99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (same).
144 United States v. McClain, 934 F.2d 822, 833 (7th Cir. 1991). In Becerra, the
court's entire discussion of the issue was as follows: "Even if admitted for its truth, the
statement was an adoptive admission, which is not hearsay. See United States v. Monks,
774 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 1985); FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(B). Rule 806 does not apply."
Becerra, 992 F.2d at 965. The Monks decision provided no analysis of the issue either.
145 See Price, 792 F.2d at 996-97.
146 See United States v. Velasco, 953 F.2d 1467, 1473 n.5 (7th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Dent, 984 F.2d 1453, 1460 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 169, and cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 209 (1993).
147 Rule 801(b) defines a "declarant" as "a person who makes a statement." FED. R.
EviD. 801(b).
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1. Identifying the Declarant
In the context of individual admissions, the answer is straightforward: the
declarant is always the party against whom the statement has been offered. Rule
801(d)(2)(A) only exempts from the hearsay rule those statements that are
offered against a party and that are the party's own statements. 148
In the context of adoptive admissions under Rule 801(d)(2)(B), however,
the declarant's identity is less obvious. The question is whether the declarant is
the person who uttered the statement or the person who adopted the statement.
The courts that have discussed this question in conjunction with Rule 806 have
reached inconsistent conclusions. In United States v. Price, the Eleventh
Circuit opined that "the utterer of words which have been adopted as an
admission by the defendant, is subject to impeachment under FRE 806." 14 9 In
United States v. Finley,150 however, the district court held that "[t]he declarant
of an adoptive admission is the one who adopts it as his own statement."151
The conclusion of the district court in Finley appears to be correct. Under
148 Rule 801(d)(2)(A) provides, in part: "A statement is not hearsay if . . . the
statement is offered against a party and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an
individual or representative capacity." FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(2)(A).
149 792 F.2d 994, 997 (11th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added). For a discussion of the facts
of Price, see supra note 142. The Seventh Circuit in McClain and the Ninth Circuit in
Becerra also addressed situations in which the defendant sought to impeach the person who
uttered a statement adopted by the defendant. In both cases, the courts held that Rule 806
does not apply to adoptive admissions, thus bypassing the question whether the person who
uttered the statement is the declarant for Rule 806 purposes. United States v. Becerra, 992
F.2d 960, 965 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. McClain, 934 F.2d 822, 833 (7th Cir.
1991).
150 708 F. Supp. 906 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
151 Id. at 911 (emphasis added). In Finley, the prosecutor planned to introduce taped
conversations between the defendants and a government informant named Burnett. On a
motion in linine, the defense argued that it should be entitled to impeach Burnett under
Rule 806, because his statements were adoptive admissions of the defendants. The court
rejected the argument, stating:
[E]ven assuming defendants did adopt Burnett's statements, making them admissible
pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(B), that does not make Burnett subject to impeachment. The
declarant of an adoptive admission is the one who adopts it as his own statement; the
declarants would therefore be defendants, not Burnett. Thus if Burnett's statements are
admissible as adoptive admissions of defendants, they may be introduced pursuant to
Rule 801(d)(2)(B) only by the government. They do not afford defendants an excuse to
impeach Burnett.
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the Federal Rules, another person's statement only becomes an adoptive
admission if the party against whom the statement is offered adopted the
statement, or manifested belief in its truth. 152 If those requirements are met,
then the party has, in a real sense, taken the other person's statement and made
it her own. In other words, once the party has embraced the statement, the
identity of the utterer is no longer relevant because the statement is being
offered as though it were the adopting party's own statement, without regard to
who actually uttered it. Indeed, that is the very rationale for the statement's
admissibility. 153
Courts have consistently recognized this same point in cases involving the
Confrontation Clause. Defendants have argued that, if an adoptive confession is
introduced against a criminal defendant, the Confrontation Clause requires that
he have the opportunity to cross-examine the person who originally made it.
But the courts have not been convinced. In Poole v. Perini,154 for example, the
Sixth Circuit explained that "[a]n adoptive confession avoids the confrontation
problem because the words of the hearsay become the words of the
defendant." 155 The court went on to hold that the defendant had not raised a
legitimate claim under the Confrontation Clause because he was asserting, in
essence, that he had not been given an opportunity to confront himself.156
152 Rule 801(d)(2)(B) provides, in part: "A statement is not hearsay if... [t]he
statement is offered against a party and is . . . (B) a statement of which the party has
manifested an adoption or belief in its truth." FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(2)(B).
153 It could be argued that the person who uttered the statement should be considered
the declarant where the person who adopted the statement did not have firsthand knowledge
of the matters described in the statement, but rather was relying entirely on the credit of the
utterer. In this situation, the argument could be made that it is the testimonial qualities of the
utterer, and not those of the person who adopted the statement, that are important. Cf.
RONALD J. ALLEN & RICHARD B. KUHNS, AN ANALYrICAL APPROACH TO EVIDENCE: TEXT,
PROBLEMS, AND CASES 387-89 (1989). Even in that situation, however, the person who
adopted the statement should be considered the declarant, for when a person adopts the
statement of another, or manifests belief in its truth, that person takes the statement as her
own. Although she may demonstrate her adoption in some shorthand way (through, for
instance, nodding or tacitly accepting), once she has adopted the statement within the
meaning of Rule 801(d)(2)(B), she has essentially reiterated the utterer's statement. Her
adoption may thus be viewed as the functional equivalent of an individual admission. See id.
On this understanding, it is clear that the person adopting the statement should still be
considered the declarant, despite her lack of firsthand knowledge, because if she had
repeated the statement that she adopted, there would be no question but that she was the
declarant of an individual admission. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIMRPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES 216 (2d ed. 1993).
154 659 F.2d 730 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 910 (1982).
155 Id. at 733.
156 Id.
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Similarly, in Oaks v. Patterson,'57 the court held that, once the defendant has
adopted the statement of another, "[s]uch a statement is regarded as the
acknowledgment of guilt or confession of the person assenting to it and not the
statement of the original declarant." 158
This reasoning applies with equal force to adoptive admissions under Rule
806 in both civil and criminal cases. Courts therefore should treat a statement
falling within Rule 801(d)(2)(B) as having been made by the person who
adopted it. As with individual admissions, therefore, the declarant of an
adoptive admission will always be the party against whom the statement is
offered.15 9 This characteristic distinguishes individual and adoptive admissions
under Rule 801(d)(2)(A) and (B) from admissions falling within Rule
801(d)(2)(C), (D), or (E) because the declarant of an individual or adoptive
admission under (A) or (B) is always the party herself; under the other
provisions, the declarant is always some third person (i.e., the authorized
spokesperson, agent or employee, or coconspirator).
2. Legitimacy of Impeaching the Declarant-Party
When the declarant is the party against whom the statement is being
offered, the question of impeachment can arise in one of two ways: the
declarant-party may wish to impeach her own credibility, or the party who
introduced the statement (the "sponsoring" or "calling" party) may wish to
impeach the credibility of its maker (the "declarant-party"). 160 In determining
157 278 F. Supp. 703 (P. Colo.), affidper curiam, 400 F.2d 392 (10th Cir. 1968).
'
58 Id. at 706; see also Wernert v. Am, 819 F.2d 613, 616-17 (6th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1011 (1988); Shiflett v. Virginia, 447 F.2d 50, 58 (4th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 994 (1972); United States v. Rollins, 862 F.2d 1282, 1297 (7th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1074 (1989); United States ex rel. Cheeks v. Russell, 424
F.2d 647, 653 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 994 (1971); cf. United States v.
Monks, 774 F.2d 945, 952 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that the person adopting the statement
can confront himself, but holding that the court must do a case-by-case Confrontation
Clause analysis when the utterer's statement has independent significance).
159 The Senate Judiciary Committee apparently recognized this point, for it excluded
statements falling within both Rule 801(d)(2)(A) and Rule 801(d)(2)(B) on the ground that
the party-opponent's credibility is always subject to attack. NOTES OF THE SENATE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 127, at 7069 n.28. In other words, the Committee assumed
that the party-opponent would always be the declarant of a statement introduced under Rule
801(d)(2)(A) and (13).
160 Even in ajoint trial, the attacking party could only be the party who introduced the
statement (the "sponsor") or the party who made or adopted the statement. If the sponsor
wished to use the statement against another party in the case, the sponsor would have to
offer the statement against that party as either a party admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(C),
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whether Rule 806 should permit such impeachment, it is necessary to focus on
whether there are special considerations that arise when the declarant is a party
to the case, and whether those considerations warrant restricting the normal
right of impeachment which would obtain if that party had testified.
a. Impeachment by the Sponsoring Pany
A basic premise of Rule 806 is that the party who introduced the statement
is, in effect, offering the declarant as a witness. 161 As a general matter, Rule
607 permits a party to impeach her own witness. 162 Thus, if Rule 806 were
extended to individual and adoptive admissions, a party introducing her
opponent's statement could then seek to impeach her opponent's credibility.
The sponsoring party might wish to impeach the declarant-party's
credibility for two reasons. First, the sponsor might simply want to get
otherwise inadmissible, but very powerfil, impeachment evidence to the jury,
hoping that the jury will also use the evidence substantively. In a criminal case,
for instance, the prosecutor might wish not only to introduce the defendant's
confession, but also evidence of the defendant's otherwise inadmissible prior
convictions, past bad acts, and prior inconsistent statements. 163 Courts have
uniformly denounced this practice. The federal courts of appeals have agreed
that, under Rule 607, impeachment by the calling party is impermissible
"where employed as a mere subterfuge to get before the jury evidence not
(D), or () or as hearsay within some exception. Either way, Rule 806 clearly would permit
impeachment. Alternatively, if the sponsor was unable to introduce the statement against the
other party, or was not interested in doing so, that party would be entitled to a limiting
instruction, directing the jury to use the evidence only against the declarant. That party,
however, would not be entitled to impeach the declarant's credibility because, at least
theoretically, the jury would not be considering the declarant's statement against that party.
161 See FED. R. EVID. 806 advisory committee's note.
162 FED. R. EVID. 607; see supra note 122 and accompanying text.
163 Federal Rule of Evidence 609 permits impeachment with prior convictions,
Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) permits impeachment with specific instances of
misconduct, and Federal Rule of Evidence 613 permits impeachment with prior inconsistent
statements. Normally, the prosecution will be able to introduce the defendant's inconsistent
statements as substantive evidence under Rule 801(d)(2)(A) or (B). If such statements are
substantively inadmissible, because, for instance, they were taken in violation of the
defendant's Miranda rights, then the prosecution might seek to use them as impeaching
evidence. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (holding that the prosecutor may
use Miranda-barred statements to impeach the credibility of the defendant's testimony);
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) (holding that the prosecution may use statements
taken in violation of the defendant's right to counsel to impeach the credibility of the
defendant's testimony).
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otherwise admissible."164
By contrast, the sponsoring party may have a second, more legitimate
reason for wanting to impeach the declarant-party. If the declarant's statement
is both helpful and harmful to the sponsor's case, the sponsor might well wish
to introduce the statement and then impeach the declarant's credibility in order
to cast doubt on the harmful portion of the statement. 165
Courts have confronted a related issue in cases in which the prosecution
has sought to impeach its own testifying, nonparty witness with a substantively
inadmissible prior inconsistent statement. In those cases, courts have permitted
the prosecution to impeach the witness in some circumstances. 16 6 Courts have
164 United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183, 190 (4th Cir. 1975); see also United
States v. Webster, 734 F.2d 1191, 1192 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting that, although Morlang is a
pre-rules case, its limitation on the prosecutor's rights under Rule 607 "has been accepted in
all circuits that have considered the issue"). The following cases indicate the uniformity of
the circuits: United States v. DeLillo, 620 F.2d 939, 946-47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 835 (1980); United States v. Sebetich, 776 F.2d 412, 428-29 (3d Cir. 1985), reh'g
denied, 828 F.2d 1020 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1017 (1988); United States v.
Hogan, 763 F.2d 697, 701-02 (5th Cir.), nwdified on other grounds, 771 F.2d 82 (5th Cir.
1985) and 779 F.2d 296 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Crouch, 731 F.2d 621, 622 n.1,
623-24 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1105 (1985); United States v. Carter, 973
F.2d 1509, 1513 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1289 (1993); United States v.
Billue, 994 F.2d 1562, 1566 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 939 (1994); United
States v. Johnson, 802 F.2d 1459, 1466 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
165 See, e.g., United States v. Velasco, 953 F.2d 1467, 1473 (7th Cir. 1992). In
Velasco, the prosecutor introduced a portion of the defendant's postarrest statement, in
which the defendant admitted involvement in the crime. The defendant sought to introduce
the rest of his statement, in which he explained why he was involved. The court held that, if
the remaining portion were admitted, then Rule 806 would give the prosecution the right to
impeach the defendant's credibility. Id. at 1473 n.5; see supra notes 137-38 and
accompanying text. Ultimately, the court held that the defendant was not entitled to
introduce the explanatory portion of his postarrest statement. Id. at 1474-76.
In certain cases the declarant-party might succeed in introducing the remaining portion
of her statement. She might do so, for example, under the rule of completeness, Rule 106,
because the other party had introduced only a portion of the statement out of context. If the
declarant-party did succeed in introducing the remainder, then the trial court would have to
determine whether that portion of the statement should be treated, for purposes of Rule 806,
as part of the statement that the other party introduced under Rule 801(d)(2)(A) or (B). That
determination would lie within the trial court's discretion. Nonetheless, it seems that in
many cases the court should hold that the party who initiated introduction of the statement
should be considered to have introduced the entire statement, because a party should not be
able to avoid responsibility for the entire statement's introduction by carving out and
offering only the favorable portions.
166 See, e.g., Webster, 734 F.2d at 1193. In Webster, the Seventh Circuit discussed the
prosecution's need to impeach its own witness:
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remained wary of the prosecution's motivation, however, requiring, for
instance, that the prosecution show that its "primary purpose" is not to place
otherwise inadmissible evidence before the jury. 167
With this type of requirement, courts have, at least to some extent,
alleviated the concern that the calling party is simply trying to sneak in
inadmissible evidence.168 Even so, the calling party's motivation is difficult to
police and, regardless of that party's motive, there remains a substantial risk
that the jury will be unable to cabin its use of substantively inadmissible
evidence. Moreover, when the calling party is not dealing with a nonparty
witness, but rather is introducing her opponent's out-of-court admission, there
is a significant additional consideration.
That consideration arises because it is no longer simply a person tangential
Suppose the government called an adverse witness that it thought would give evidence
both helpful and harmful to it, but it also thought that the harmful aspect could be
nullified by introducing the witness's prior inconsistent statement.... [We are at a loss
to understand why the government should be put to the choice between the Scylla of
forgoing impeachment and the Charybdis of not calling at all a witness from whom it
expects to elicit genuinely helpful evidence.
Id.
167 Hogan, 763 F.2d at 702. Other courts have imposed similar, though potentially
somewhat different, requirements. See, e.g., Webster, 734 F.2d at 1192-93 (permitting the
prosecution to impeach its own witness with a substantively inadmissible prior inconsistent
statement as long as the prosecution acted in good faith); DeLillo, 620 F.2d at 946-47
(permitting the prosecution to impeach its own witness with a substantively inadmissible
prior inconsistent statement if the witness's testimony was essential to the prosecution's
case).
168 Professor Graham has argued strenuously that the courts should return to requiring
the calling party to show that it was both surprised and affirmatively damaged by the
witness's adverse testimony. In explaining the advantages of the stricter rule, Professor
Graham has stated:
The requirement of surprise and affirmative damage permitted a party to impeach his
own witness when truly necessary. At the same time, the requirement prevented a party
from calling a witness solely to place a substantively inadmissible prior inconsistent
statement before the jury in the hope that the jury would disregard a limiting instruction
and consider the statement as substantive evidence.
GRAHAM, supra note 5, § 607.3, at 425. In the context of Rule 806, imposing these
requirements on the sponsoring party would effectively preclude that party from impeaching
the declarant's credibility because the sponsoring party obviously would not be surprised by
the content of the out-of-court statement that the sponsoring party itself had introduced.
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to the case whose credibility the calling party has put in issue and then seeks to
attack. The target of the attack is a party to the case itself. The problems,
therefore, go beyond the already significant risk that the calling party's motive
may be impure and that the jury will receive (and misuse) substantively
inadmissible evidence. Now, the direct result of the use of the impeaching
evidence is to damage the declarant-party's credibility.
The harm effected by this result is substantial because the credibility of a
party is so centrally important to determining the outcome of any case. The
Federal Rules and the common law contain a carefully balanced set of
impeachment rules that restrict, in important ways, the ability of a party to
impugn her opponent's credibility. 169 It is unfair to allow a party to sidestep
these restrictions through the simple device of introducing an out-of-court
statement that her opponent has made. When one party has introduced an out-
of-court statement which puts her opponent's credibility in issue, therefore, that
party should not, by virtue of her own act of introducing such evidence,
thereby be liberated to take otherwise impermissible steps to attack her
opponent's credibility. 170
This possibility is of particular concern in a criminal case because the
otherwise inadmissible impeaching evidence can be particularly damaging to
the defendant. 171 But the harm caused by this result could be substantial in civil
cases as well. As a matter of policy, therefore, a party should not be permitted
to use her opponent's statements as a vehicle to introduce damaging, and
otherwise inadmissible, impeachment evidence.
b. Impeachment by the Declarant-Party
The question remains, however, whether Rule 806 should permit the
169 See, e.g., United States v. May, 727 F.2d 764, 765 (8th Cir. 1984) ("Although the
Federal Rules of Evidence allow impeachment of a witness's credibility, Fed. R. Evid. 607,
the rules carefully limit methods of impeachment.").
170 Professors Louisell and Mueller have suggested that, because the sponsoring party
would be entitled under Rule 607 to impeach the declarant-party if she had called the
declarant-party as a witness, "[n]o good reason appears for a different result if one party
introduces the out-of-court statements of the other as admissions." 4 LOUISELL & MUELLER,
supra note 5, § 501, at 1255 n.28. The reasons described above, however, counsel strongly
against permitting the sponsoring party to engage in such impeachment. Further, in a civil
case, if the sponsoring party wishes to impeach her opponent, she may do so by calling her
opponent as a witness, rather than merely introducing her opponent's out-of-court
statement.
171 The most prominent example of such overwhelmingly prejudicial evidence, of
course, is impeachment of the defendant with prior convictions under Rule 609. The extent
and effect of this type of prejudice, in particular, is discussed in Part 11.
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declarant-party to impeach her own credibility once her individual or adoptive
admission has been introduced.172 In many cases, of course, a party will not
want to impeach her own credibility. There are exceptions, however. Most
significantly, a party might want to introduce an inconsistent statement to
suggest that her inconsistency undermines her credibility and thus casts doubt
on the truth of her damaging admission. 173
Impeachment in these circumstances, however, almost necessarily involves
a suspect purpose. If the party's inconsistent statement was admissible
substantively, then the party would not need to introduce it as impeaching
evidence. It is only when the inconsistent statement is inadmissible
substantively (because, for instance, it is hearsay) that using it for impeachment
is attractive. And using the statement for impeachment is very attractive in that
situation because it enables the party to place the inadmissible, but presumably
helpful, evidence before the jury with the attendant likelihood that the jury will
use it substantively. 174
This risk also occurs when the calling party seeks to impeach her own
witness with substantively inadmissible evidence. But the likelihood that the
party seeking to impeach is acting in bad faith is much greater when the party
172 It is important to distinguish the issue here, which is whether the declarant-party
should be permitted to impeach her own credibility, from a situation in which the declarant-
party is simply trying to place her statement in context. The declarant-party should be
permitted to place her statement in context by, for instance, developing or clarifying the
circumstances in which the statement was made, the tone that was used, or the content of
any other statements which accompanied and shed light on the statement introduced. If the
declarant-party is providing context that will help the jury understand the statement, she is
not impeaching her credibility, but rather is affording the jury a broader perspective on the
tenor and meaning of the statement. This procedure is consistent with the principle of
completeness, which permits a party to introduce further evidence that will help ensure that
a statement admitted by the other party is presented fairly. See 1 LOUISELL & MUELLER,
supra note 5, § 49, at 352-60; 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 29, § 56, at 225-28; 1
WEJNSTIN & BERGER, supra note 12, 106[01]-[02], at 106-2.1 to -21.
173 See, e.g., United States v. Dent, 984 F.2d 1453 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
169, and cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 209 (1993). In Dent, federal charges were brought against
the defendant for being a felon in knowing possession of a firearm. At trial, the prosecutor
introduced the defendant's plea of guilty to a misdemeanor state charge for unlawful use of
a weapon, which arose out of the same facts. After the guilty plea was admitted under Rule
801(d)(2)(A), the defendant sought to impeach his own credibility through Rule 806 by
introducing inconsistent, exculpatory statements that he had made to his state court lawyer.
Id. at 1457, 1460.
174 The court apparently recognized this point in Dent. There, the Seventh Circuit
upheld the district court's ruling that "the lawyer's testimony regarding Dent's lack of any
knowledge of the gun was not sought simply to impeach the plea, but to prove that Dent did
not know the gun was present." Id. at 1460.
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seeks to impeach herself, rather than some nonparty witness. It seems highly
unlikely that the party genuinely would want to introduce the statement not for
its truth, but rather to impress upon the jury that she is not to be believed.
Clearly, Rule 806 should not permit impeachment where the declarant-
party's purpose is the illegitimate one of giving the jury substantively
inadmissible evidence in the guise of impeachment. The courts' reasoning in
the Rule 607 cases-which uniformly hold that the calling party may not
impeach her own witness where impeachment is a "mere subterfuge" to give
the jury otherwise inadmissible evidence-necessarily leads to this
conclusion. 175
While it seems that the declarant-party's purpose in seeking to impeach
herself with an inconsistent statement will almost always be improper, it is
possible, although far less likely, that the declarant-party might wish to
impeach her own credibility in other ways. She might wish to show, for
instance, that she has a reputation for untruthfulness, or she might wish to
show that she has some relevant defect in sensory or mental capacity which
undermines the credibility of the admission. Although it certainly seems
counter-intuitive that any party would genuinely seek to convince the jury that
she is not credible, it is possible. For several interrelated reasons, however,
Rule 806 should not permit a declarant-party to do so.
First, this conclusion is most consistent with the rationale for admitting
party admissions into evidence. Party admissions are generally allowed into
evidence not because they are inherently reliable, but rather based on notions of
fairness in the adversary system. The sense that it is fair to allow one party to
use her opponent's admissions stems, at least in part, from the feeling that the
opponent "cannot object to [his own statement] being received as prima fade
trustworthy." 176
In addition, the critical concern about hearsay-the lack of opportunity to
cross-examine-is absent in this setting because it is the adverse party's own
statement that is being admitted. 177 Thus, any need that the party may have to
175 United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183, 190 (4th Cir. 1975); see supra note 164
and accompanying text.
176 Edmund M. Morgan, Admissions as an Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 30 YALE
L.J. 355, 361 (1920); see also CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
EvIDENCE § 239, at 503 (1st ed. 1954) ("This notion that it does not lie in the opponent's
mouth to question the trustworthiness of his own declarations is an expression of feeling
rather than logic but it is an emotion so universal that it may stand for a reason.").
17 7 See 2 GREGORY P. JOSEPH & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, EvIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE
FEDERAL RULES IN THE STATES § 61.3, at 2 (1987) (stating that Rule 806 "is designed to
minimize a principal danger against which the hearsay rule protects-the inability of the
factfinder to assess the credibility of the out-of-court declarant...").
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challenge her own statements can be satisfied by providing the party with the
opportunity to take the witness stand. 178 As Dean Wigmore stated in
recognizing this distinction, "a party is in theory present during the trial, and
has in fact ample opportunity to protect himself by taking the stand for any
explanations which he may deem necessary after hearing the testimony to his
alleged admissions." 179
Second, the possibility that a party would be permitted to impeach her own
admission, and thus to put her credibility in issue in only a limited way, is
conceptually problematic. If, for example, a party were to testify that her
statement was unreliable, the opposing party would certainly be given the
opportunity to cross-examine such testimony to explore whether it was self-
serving or misleading. If, on the other hand, Rule 806 were to permit the party
to impeach her own credibility without taking the witness stand, the opposing
party would have no effective rejoinder. Rather, opposing counsel would be
relegated to the standard alternative of seeking to rehabilitate the credibility of
the witness. 180 This alternative is unsatisfactory for the opposing counsel
because it would require her to bolster the credibility of her opponent in the
case.
Finally, as noted above, it seems likely that in the vast majority of cases
the declarant-party's purpose in offering the impeaching evidence will be
illegitimate because the party will be attempting to present otherwise
inadmissible evidence to the jury, in the hope that the jury will use the evidence
substantively.181 As a practical matter, it is difficult to conceptualize many
178 In most situations, the party's ability to take the witness stand will provide
sufficient opportunity for that party to impeach her own statements. In a criminal case,
however, where the declarant-party is the defendant, this response is not entirely satisfactory
because under the Fifth Amendment a criminal defendant has a constitutional right not to
take the witness stand. Although a rule restricting the defendant's ability to impeach the
credibility of her own statements without taking the witness stand will not force the
defendant to testify, it may create greater pressure on her to do so. In the event that this
pressure were to become so great as to violate the criminal defendant's rights under the
Fifth Amendment, then the demands of the Constitution would, of course, trump the
specific requirements of Rule 806. It would thus be useful for the explanatory notes to Rule
806 to alert the trial courts to this possibility.
179 2 JoHm H. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE IN TRiALs AT COMMON LAw § 1051, at 1220 (1st
ed. 1904). See generally id. §§ 1048-1051, at 1216-21. It is worth noting that the
declarant-party can still introduce other, contradictory evidence that undermines the
admission as part of her substantive case without taking the witness stand. Also, the
declarant-party can, on cross-examination or through the rule of completeness, ensure that
the admission is placed in its full context.
180 See FaD. R. EviD. 608(a), 806.
181 See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
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cases in which a party would genuinely seek to impeach her own credibility. 182
This fact alone presents a significant argument for a blanket rule that will lead
to the proper result in the great majority of cases. 183
Thus, the special considerations involved when the declarant is a party to
the case counsel in favor of limiting the impeachment rights that would
normally be accorded if that party had testified as a witness. The better
approach, therefore, is to refuse to allow impeachment of declarants of
statements admitted as individual and adoptive admissions under Rule
801(d)(2)(A) and (B).
C. Proposed Clanfication of Rule 806
For these reasons, Rule 806 should not authorize impeachment of the
declarant of a statement admitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(A) or (B).184 This result
is consistent with Rule 806 as it is currently written, but it conflicts with the
indications of congressional intent in the legislative history of the rule, a
situation which has caused confusion for the federal courts. The exclusion of
individual and adoptive admissions from the scope of Rule 806 should therefore
182 See generally 4 LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 5, § 501, at 1249 ("It is
unlikely in the extreme that a party would seek to impeach himself.").
183 An important function of the rules of evidence is to facilitate the ease of
administration of an extremely complex justice system. Where a clear rule is likely to
provide the proper result in the great majority of cases, it is sensible to adopt that rule and
thus obviate the need for judges to make individualized assessments amidst the hurly-burly
of trial proceedings. This rationale informs many of the policy determinations embodied in
the Federal Rules of Evidence, and it serves as a significant additional reason to prohibit
impeachment in this context as well. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404 (prohibiting use of
character evidence to prove propensity); FED. R. EVID. 803(1)-(23) (providing categorical
exceptions to the hearsay rule); FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1)-(4) (same); FED. R. EVID. 902
(providing for self-authentication of certain exhibits).
184 It is possible that the sponsoring party might try to make an end run around the
prohibition on impeaching the declarant of an individual or adoptive admission by seeking
to admit the statement under one of the hearsay exceptions in Rule 803 or 804. For
instance, the prosecutor might offer the defendant's out-of-court statement not as an
individual admission, but rather as a statement against interest under Rule 804(b)(3). The
structure of the rules, however, should be understood to prevent this practice. If the
declarant's statement falls within the definitions in Rule 801(d)(2), then the statement is
deemed not hearsay. Thus, the prohibition against admission of hearsay, contained in Rule
802, would not apply, and the exceptions to the hearsay rule, contained in Rules 803 and
804, would never come into play. In other words, where the statement is defined as not
hearsay, the hearsay exceptions are not applicable because they only serve to remove from
the hearsay rule statements that would otherwise fall within it.
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be clarified with the following revision to the text of Rule 806:
When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in Rule 801(d)(2),
(C), (D), or (E) (but not (A) or (B)), has been admitted in evidence, the
credibility of the declarant may be attacked, and if attacked may be
supported, by any evidence which would be admissible for those
purposes if declarant had testified as a witness. Evidence of a statement
or conduct by the declarant at any time, inconsistent with the
declarant's hear-say statement, is not subject to any requirement that the
declarant may have been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain. If
the party against whom a hearsay the declarant's statement has been
admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party is entitled to
examine the declarant on the statement as if under cross-examination.
This proposed clarification includes minor changes in the second and third
sentences of the rule. These changes are designed to clarify that Rule 806
provides uniform treatment with respect to declarants of hearsay statements and
declarants of statements defined in Rule 801(d)(2)(C), (D), or (E). The
references to "hearsay" statements in the second and third sentences of the
current rule might be taken to suggest that those provisions apply only to
declarants of hearsay statements. These references are likely a result of sloppy
drafting; the amendment that added statements defined in Rule 801(d)(2)(C),
(D), or (E) to Rule 806 was incorporated in the first sentence, and the rest of
the rule was not then revised to accommodate this change.185
With respect to the second sentence, the omission of any reference to
admissions is unproblematic. That sentence allows a party to impeach a hearsay
declarant with evidence of an inconsistent statement without satisfying the
requirement contained in Rule 613(b) that the witness be provided the
opportunity to explain or deny. Rule 613(b) itself, however, specifically
provides that it "does not apply to admissions of a party-opponent as defined in
rule 801(d)(2)," thus obviating any need for Rule 806 to do the same. 186
With respect to the third sentence, however, the reference only to
"hearsay" statements suggests that, if the opposing party calls the declarant as a
witness, that party will only be entitled to cross-examine the declarant if the
declarant's statement was hearsay, and not if it was defined as nonhearsay in
Rule 801(d)(2)(C), (D), or (E). There is no sound justification for any such
distinction. If the sponsoring party had called the authorized spokesperson,
employee, agent, or coconspirator as a witness, the opposing party would be
185 See 2 STEPHAN A. SALTZBURG & MICHAEL M. MARTIN, FEDERAL RULES OF
EvDNCE MANUAL 466-67 (5th ed. 1990).
186 FED. R. EvD. 613(b).
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entitled to cross-examine that witness. The opposing party should enjoy that
same right against a declarant, especially since it is the sponsoring party's
tactical decision to use an out-of-court statement rather than live testimony that
forces the opposing party to call the declarant as a witness herself. The
Supreme Court apparently recognized this point in United States v. Inadi,187 in
which the Court stated that "if the party against whom a co-conspirator
statement has been admitted calls the declarant as a witness, 'the party is
entitled to examine him on the statement as if under cross-examination.'' 188
Two states, Alaska and Vermont, have corrected these drafting ambiguities in
their versions of Rule 806.189
V. CONCLUSION
Rule 806 serves a useful and desirable purpose in the Federal Rules of
Evidence by permitting a nontestifying declarant whose out-of-court statement
is admitted for its truth to be impeached on the same grounds that are available
to impeach the credibility of a witness who actually testifies in court. It thus
affords the trier of fact a more complete context in which to assess the value of
out-of-court statements that have been admitted into evidence. For the most
part, Rule 806 works effectively to serve this sensible purpose.
It is nonetheless true that the peculiar nature of Rule 806, which always
applies in tandem with the separate witness-impeachment rules, results in
conceptual and practical difficulties. These difficulties stem from the fact that
Rule 806, which permits impeachment of nontestifying declarants, must operate
in conjunction with impeachment rules that were specifically and carefully
187 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
188 Id. at 397 (quoting FFD. R. EviD. 806); see also 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra
note 12, 806[01], at 806-12 to -13.
Professors Louisell and Mueller, however, suggest that this reading of Rule 806 might
be unwise, because admissions by authorized spokespersons, employees, and agents under
Rule 801(d)(2)(C) and (D) "usually involve declarants friendly to the party against whom
their statements are offered." 4 LOuISELL & MUELLER, supra note 5, § 501, at 1249 n.12.
This possibility, however, also arises when such persons are called to testify, and in both
situations, Rule 611(c) gives the court leeway to deny the cross-examining lawyer the right
to use leading questions. See FED. R. EviD. 611(c); id. advisory committee's note
(explaining that the wording of the rule firnishes "a basis for denying the use of leading
questions when the cross-examination is cross-examination in form only and not in fact").
18 9 See ALAsKA R. EvID. 806 (the rule is modeled on Federal Rule 806, but refers in
the second sentence to "his statement" and in the third sentence to "a hearsay statement or a
statement defined in Rule 801(d)(2)(C), (D), or (E)"); VT. R. EVID. 806 (the rule is
modeled in Federal Rule 806, but refers in the second sentence to "the statement admitted
in evidence," and in the third sentence to "a statement").
[Vol. 56:495
EVIDENCE RULE 806
designed for use against testifying witnesses.
In order for Rule 806 to work fairly and effectively, therefore, it is
important to analyze the policy considerations and the balancing of interests
that shaped the other impeachment rules in the special context of impeachment
of a declarant who is not a testifying witness. This Article has attempted to
provide that kind of analysis in three areas, and it has reached the following
conclusions. First, where the declarant is a criminal defendant, Rule 806 should
only permit impeachment with prior convictions and specific instances of
conduct showing untruthfulness if the defendant has affirmatively placed his
credibility in issue. Second, Rule 806 should vest the trial court with discretion
to allow the impeaching party to use extrinsic evidence of specific instances of
conduct when impeaching a nontestifying declarant. Third, Rule 806 should not
authorize impeachment of declarants of individual and adoptive admissions
admitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(A) and (B).
Adoption of these proposals will better enable Rule 806 to work in
harmony with the other impeachment rules. The full text of Rule 806 should
thus be amended to read as follows:
RULE 806.
ATTACKING AND SUPPORTING CREDIBILITY
OF DECLARANT
When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in Rule
801(d)(2)(C), (D), or (E) (but not (A) or (B)), has been admitted in
evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be attacked, and if
attacked may be supported, by any evidence which would be
admissible for those purposes if declarant had testified as a witness,
subject to the following:
(a) If the declarant is an accused, the credibility of the declarant
may be attacked with specific instances of conduct that are probative of
untruthfulness, as provided in Rule 608(b), or with prior convictions,
only if the declarant has affirmatively placed the declarant's credibility
in issue;(b) Except as provided in subsection (a), if the declarant does not
testify, the court may, in its discretion, permit the use of extrinsic
evidence to prove specific instances of conduct that are probative of
truthfulness or untruthfulness, as provided in Rule 608(b), as a means
of attacking or supporting the credibility of the declarant;
(c) Evidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant at any
time, inconsistent with the declarant's statement, is not subject to any
requirement that the declarant may have been afforded an opportunity
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to deny or explain.
If the party against whom the declarant's statement has been
admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party is entitled to
examine the declarant on the statement as if under cross-examination.
In addition, the explanatory notes to Rule 806 should provide guidance to
the courts on three points. First, they should describe when the declarant who
is a criminal defendant should be considered to have affirmatively placed his
credibility in issue, for purposes of applying subsection (a) of the proposed
amended rule. 190 Second, they should provide guidance about how the courts
should exercise their discretion under subsection (b) of the proposed amended
rule in determining whether to permit the use of extrinsic evidence.' 9' Third,
they should caution that, when the declarant-party is a criminal defendant who
seeks to impeach the credibility of his own statement, the court should take
care that the defendant's right not to testify under the Fifth Amendment is not
unduly burdened.' 9 2
19 0 See supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
191 See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
192 See supra note 178.
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